The Fallacy of Neutrality: Diary of an Election Observer by Woods, Jeanne M.
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 18 Issue 3 
1997 
The Fallacy of Neutrality: Diary of an Election Observer 
Jeanne M. Woods 
Loyola University New Orleans School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Election Law Commons, Law and Politics 
Commons, and the Law and Race Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jeanne M. Woods, The Fallacy of Neutrality: Diary of an Election Observer, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 475 (1997). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol18/iss3/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE FALLACY OF NEUTRALITY:
DIARY OF AN ELECTION OBSERVER
Jeanne M. Woods*
"What's past is Prologue...
Tuesday, April 26, 1994.
Shrouded in a Rawlsian veil of ignorance,2 1 have no anchor in time
or space. The veil is quite fashionable: lacy; black; seductive. Draped in
its folds I am ageless and nameless, undefined by race, creed, or gen-
der. I have no past. My will is free, unencumbered by history or tradi-
tion. I am newly born.
Nearby in a Capetown hospital, another newborn prepares to emerge
from the dark warmth of her mother's womb. At 1:45 p.m., a baby girl
will brave the glare of flourescent reality as her mother is gently coaxed
by those around her. The air is electric, filled with tense expectancy; the
urgings become more insistent.
Beads of perspiration gather on the woman's brow as she reaches
for the hand extended before her. Her labor has been long and hard;
bolts of lightning sear through her bulging frame to create a passage for
the new life. She fears at times that she will not endure, that the pain
will overcome her before the opening has widened sufficiently, her
infant stillborn, suffocated in the birth canal. She struggles to comply
with the encouraging words of those around her.
* Associate Professor, Loyola University New Orleans School of Law. J.D., Temple
University School of Law (1981); B.A., Antioch College (1974). I would like to thank
Professor David Kennedy and the participants in the 1996 Harvard Law School Law Teachers
and Scholars Workshop for helping to shape the direction of this essay. I would also like to
thank Henry J. Richardson I and Cynthia Lepow for their comments on earlier drafts.
Finally, I would like to thank Christine Thomas for her outstanding research assistance.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, sc. 1, 11. 253-54.
2. See JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12, 136-42 (1971). The Rawlsian project
attempts to rehabilitate traditional social contract doctrine, id. at 16, in order to maintain its
viability in the face of the gross disparities in wealth distribution. His polemic against
utilitarianism gropes with the inevitable contradiction between formal equality (equal liberty)
and substantive equality (distribution of wealth). See id at 6. While the social contract reflects
the domestic liberal paradigm, premised on individual autonomy and consent to the social
order, in international law contract is replaced by treaty, and autonomy is replaced by
sovereignty. This essay argues that in both systems, neutrality-metaphorically the veil of
ignorance--supports the fiction of consent.
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But "push" is not the exhortation that is to greet the new arrival. For
the mother-to-be is making history not only for herself, but for her
world. And so, she faithfully follows the instructions of her coaches:
"Put your 'X' in the box." And as she does, the proud mother ensures
that her newborn daughter will forever reflect her place in that history:
she bestows upon her the name "Nelson Madiba" 3 Lakay, thus heralding
the birth of South African democracy.4
NEUTRALITY AS LEGAL FICTION
A product of a historically specific social order, political theory
plays a distinct role with respect to that order. As a manifestation of a
philosophy, or, world view, it reflects either the dominant discourse in
the society, the purpose of which is to justify and maintain the status
quo,5 or an alternative view which seeks to discredit, and ultimately
change, the status quo. A theory which is progressive in one era may be
retrogressive at another point in time. Legal theory is distinct, but not
divorced from political theory;6 the two are dialectically interconnected,
each influenced by and, in turn, influencing the other. And the interplay
of theoretical models reflects, and is reflected in, real social and histori-
cal events.7
The theory of neutrality plays a key role in maintaining the credibil-
ity of the existing liberal order. It is the guarantor of the social contract,
3. "Madiba," which means grandfather, is a term of affection by which South Africans
refer to Nelson Mandela. See Philip Hoare, Into the Heart of the Hero's Homeland, THE
INDEPENDENT, May 10, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10465951.
4. The first democratic elections in South Africa were held from April 26-29, 1994. The
voting period included one day for "Special Votes," designed to accommodate the ill and
physically disabled, prisoners, and pregnant women. See Report of the Secretary-General on
the Question of South Africa, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Plenary Meetings, at 12, U.N. Doc.
5/1994/717 (1994) [hereinafter Secretary General's Report]. Votes were cast for a party list
of candidates, rather than for an individual candidate. Given the high level of illiteracy
(estimated 60-70% of adult population) and the first-time voter status of the majority of the
population, the relatively simple system of marking the ballot with an 'X' was needed. See
Kader Asmal & Jacques de Ville, An Electoral System for South Africa, in FREE AND FAIR
ELECTIONS 1, 21-22 (Nico Steytler et al. eds., 1994).
5. See, e.g., KARL MARX AND FREDERICK ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY 65 (C.J.
Arthur ed., 1970) ("[T]he thinkers of the class ... make the perfecting of the illusion of the
class about itself their chief source of livelihood .... ).
6. See, e.g., Arthur S. Miller & Ronald F. Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661, 668 (1960) (stating that "constitutional law is
for the most part political theory expressed in lawyers' language").
7. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 58 (1981) ("Every action is the bearer and
expression of more or less theory-laden beliefs and concepts; every piece of theorising and
every expression of belief is a political and moral action.").
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the undisputed sine qua non of fairness and justice. Derived from the
Latin neuter, meaning "neither," neutrality connotes restraint from
choice between competing values. It is Rousseau's concept of law:
general and abstract rules. Under this conception, privileges, and class
distinctions are legitimate so long as they do not expressly identify
particular individuals subject to them.'
Neutrality is one of many conceptual fictions of liberal discourse.9 A
legal fiction is "contrived by the law" to facilitate adjudication of is-
sues.' ° Such fictions may serve as symbols, to make abstract concepts
tangible' or, they may be myths designed to promote some normative
principle or goal.' 2 The problem arises when these fictions cease to be
recognized as inventions, or as "presumptions about reality," 3 and are
believed to have an independent existence in reality. Then, they "purport
to provide us with an objective and impersonal criterion, but they do
not."' 4 According to the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, a fiction is "a
pseudo-concept available for a variety of ideological uses .... Hence,
when we encounter its use in practical life, it is always necessary to ask
what actual project or purpose is being concealed by its use."' 5 For
example, Professor Derrick Bell argues that racially neutral anti-discrim-
ination law disguises continued bias, and creates a tendency for self-
blame because of the difficulty of identifying more subtle forms of
oppression.1 6 Similarly, in employment law, the enforcement of a neutral
right to contract ignores the imbalance of power between worker and
employer. 17
Neutrality is not just another fiction, however; it is central to "the
whole liberal world view of (private) rights and (public) sovereignty
mediated by the rule of law ... [and] is only an attractive mirage
masking the reality of economic and political power."' 8 The supposed
8. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 82, book II, ch 6. (Maurice
Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968).
9. See MACINTYRE, supra note 7, at 62 (discussing fictions of "utility" and "rights").
10. BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 894 (6th ed. 1990).
11. The fiction of corporate personality provides one example.
12. For example, the fiction of the "reasonable man" promotes socially acceptable
conduct.
13. See Martin Marietta Co. v. Gould, Inc., 70 F.3d 768, 771 (4th Cir. 1995).
14. MACINTYRE, supra note 7, at 68.
15. Id. at 62.
16. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BoTToM OF THE WELL 6 (1992).
17. See id. at 101.
18. Id. at 103.
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neutrality of the liberal legal order supports other fictions that comprise
the constitutive pillars of that order. For example: that individuals consent
to the social contract; that because of this consent liberalism preserves
individual autonomy; and that because the liberal order is premised on
individual autonomy and consent, its social and economic consequences
are legitimate and just.
Wednesday, April 27, 1994.
I am afloat, in the original position,'9 when Johannesburg Airport is
bombed.' The news is sobering, for being permitted to know something
of the natural order of things,2' I know that bombs can kill. I am on my
way to the front lines, so to speak, with only an "Official Observer"
armband to protect me.
I have, you see, experienced first-hand the wanton violence that
defines South African political life, 22 narrowly escaping death in neigh-
boring Gaborone, Botswana...
It is June 1985. I am here on a United Nations-sponsored mission
to document South African aggression aimed at destabilizing neigh-
boring states.23 It is one a.m. on the morning after my arrival in
19. See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 18. In Rawls' theory the original position, an abstraction
of the Lockean state of nature, produces not a liberal, contract-based system of government,
but rather establishes the "principles of justice" that inhere in such a system. Id. at 11.
Tautologically, the original position itself incorporates "our considered judgments of justice."
Id. at 21.
20. A bomb placed in a white Peugeot exploded at Jan Smuts Airport at 7:15 a.m. on
April 27, the first day of general voting. Police arrested thirty-one members of right-wing
groups-including a policeman and a police reservist-in connection with that blast, as well
as a series of car bombings on the eve of the election which killed twenty-one people and
injured at least 173. Andre Koopman, 31 Arrested in Bombs 'Breakthrough,' CAPE TiMES, April
28, 1994, at 1.
21. See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 137 (Parties in the original position are presumed to know
the "general facts about human society.").
22. By the end of April 1994, 20,436 people had been killed in political violence in South
Africa. Of these, 1,439 were killed in the four months preceding the election. See INTERNA-
TIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DEMOCRATIC LAWYERS LEGAL OBSERVER MISSION TO THE SOUTH
AFRICAN ELECTIONS, FINAL REPORT 21-22 (June, 1994) [hereinafter IADL REPORT].
23. Following the liberation of Angola and Mozambique from Portuguese colonialism in
1975, and majority rule in Zimbabwe in 1980, the South African apartheid regime, portraying
itself as a preserve of "democracy" and "Western values" surrounded by hostile "Marxist-
Leninist" States, and it began a campaign of economic and military destabilization against its
neighbors. This campaign involved direct aggression in the form of air strikes and commando
raids against so-called "terrorist bases" in the neighboring countries, and the creation and/or
maintenance of so-called "rebel groups" which roamed the countryside attacking primarily
civilian and economic targets. See, e.g., RICHARD LEONARD, SOUTH AFRICA AT WAR: WHITE
POWER AND THE CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 59-97 (1983).
[Vol. 18:475
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Gaborone, when intermittent explosions penetrate the stillness of the
slumbering town. I am thinking that the ominous sounds could not
mean what I feared; after all, I had just arrived!
The first timid rays of light confirm the unthinkable; shine brightly
through the lingering smoke; dance with the shadows of burnt-out
carcasses of houses and cars; illuminate the blood-soaked beds, the
vivid red splashes on walls and window sills; expose the dismem-
bered limbs and decapitated head peeping obscenely through the
rubble; steady the nerves of the local folk flocking from the police
stations to which they had fled in terror.
Crowds mill around the gutted ruins, stare in shocked disbelief as
the meaning of the night's events sinks in. They had been invaded.
South African commandos in white Datsun mini-buses and Ford
Cortina vans had careened through their quiet residential neigh-
borhoods; shouting over loudspeakers in Afrikaans,24 English,
Sesotho, ordering them to stay indoors and switch off their lights;
wiping out the unlucky ones who got in the way. Attacking ten
scattered houses simultaneously with heavy artillery-hand gre-
nades, machine guns, mortar shells. Retreating triumphantly toward
the South African border.
Twelve are confirmed dead. I tour the smoldering sites, interviewing
witnesses. I photograph the bullet-riddled body of a pajama-clad
child a little younger than my own daughter. I listen to Levi's
trembling account of survival in the house where I was supposed to
have been; of crouching under a bed while his brother and sister-in-
law are cut down by machine-gunfire. But for my tardy driver-and
no telephone-I might have been among the victims.
Now the violent specter of the apartheid past threatens to consume
the country's impending democratic debut.' The Goldstone Commission
of Inquiry into Violence and Public Intimidation reports a high-level
conspiracy to derail the elections, involving senior officials of the police,
24. Afrikaans is the language of the formerly ruling Afrikaners, and is associated with the
domination and oppression of Blacks. See Paul Taylor, Father of His Country, WASH. POST
MAO., Feb. 13, 1994, at 10, 17.
25. Apartheid was officially abolished in February, 1991, with the repeal of the Black
Land Act (27) of 1913, the Development Trust and Land Act (18) of 1936, and the Group
Areas Act (36) of 1966. See C.G. van der Merwe, Law of Property (Including Mortgage and
Pledge), in ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAw 121-26 (1991).
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the Inkatha Freedom Party (Inkatha), the KwaZulu police, and right-wing
paramilitary groups-many of the same players in the destabilization
campaign.
Yet, I am here as the bearer of law, and I know that the law born of
the social contract "is not burdened by the past." 27 I am one of thousands
of neutral observers28 dispatched through various governmental and
nongovernmental organs to monitor the elections and to determine
whether they are "free and fair., 29 I am ushering in a new phase of the
struggle for democracy and human rights in South Africa, under the
auspices of nationally negotiated, internationally brokered elections.
As an adjudicator of fairness, I serve a judicial norm-enforcing
function; as an international monitor, I am not only an arbiter, but a
norm-creator, midwife to a gestating right to democracy. 0 I must,
therefore, exorcise Gaborone's intransigent ghost,31 shed my prior
empirical knowledge. 2 For in order to yield justice, I must remain in the
26. See Letter Dated 31 March 1994from the Chairman of the Special Committee against
Apartheid to the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 38, at 9, para. 32,
U.N. Doc. A148/921, 5/1994/383 (1994) [hereinafter Letter Dated 31 March 1994]. The
Goldstone Commission, headed by a prominent South African jurist, was created by the United
Nations Security Council pursuant to Resolution 765 (July 1992).
27. POST-MODERN LAW: ENLIGHTENMENT, REVOLUTION AND THE THE DEATH OF MAN
7 (Anthony Carty ed., 1990) [hereinafter Carty].
28. Election observers were bound by a Code of Conduct, enacted into South African law.
Independent Electoral Commission Act (Act No. 150 of 1993) § 24(l)(h), reprinted in IADL
REPORT, supra note 22, at F-13. The Act provided, in pertinent part "[o]bservers shall maintain
strict impartiality in the conduct of their duties, and shall at no time express any bias, or
preference with reference to any registered party or nominated candidate." Id
29. The United Nations Organization Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) was established
in September, 1992 to help lay the groundwork for the elections. Its "Electoral Mandate,"
agreed to by the U.N. Security Council in January 1994, identifies these specific goals: to
observe the conduct of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and its organs in all stages
of the electoral process; to observe the various measures taken to ensure freedom of organiza-
tion, movement, assembly and expression during the election campaign; to monitor security
efforts; to verify sufficient voter education efforts; to verify that qualified voters were permitted
to vote; to verify free access to voting stations, secrecy of the vote, proper custody of ballots,
secure counts, and the timely announcement of poll results; and to coordinate the deployment
and activities of other international observers. See Secretary-General's Report, supra note 3 at
14, para. 54.
30. Support for a right to democracy is reflected in numerous international instruments.
See, e.g., Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections G.A.
Res. 45/150, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc A/45/150 (1991); Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples G.A. Res. 1514(xv), U.N. GAOR, 15th
Sess., U.N. Doc A/450 (1960); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (Ill),
U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., art. 2, U.N. Doc. A1810 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, art. 25, 99 U.N.T.S. 171 (Mar. 23, 1976). See generally Gregory H. Fox, The
Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 539, 552, 572-90
(1992).
31. See Carty, supra note 27, at 7 ("We do not contract. Instead, we are already contract-
ed .... As contracted, we are bound to the past.").
32. See RAwLs, supra note 2, at 19 (Principles chosen in original position should match
"our considered convictions of justice ... which we now make intuitively.").
[Vol. 18:475
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original position behind the veil of ignorance.33 The veil will shield my
judgments from the past and its present-day consequences, the violence
and the fear, the yesterday and the tomorrow, the known and the un-
known.
Saturday, April 15, 1994.
I have just arrived in Johannesburg, exhausted but thrilled. After
working against apartheid for more than twenty years, I will participate
in its final downfall. The city feels very different from what I remember
from my last visit...
It is August 1985, during the state of emergency.34 I have traveled
here spontaneously as part of my investigatory mission.5 It is the
height of the popular uprising led by the United Democratic Front;
36
thousands of pro-democracy activists have been arrested and
detained.37 I did not plan to come here. But my exiled friends in the
Frontline States38 insist that it is necessary if I am to understand
fully the regime's destabilization strategy. I am also curious to find
out just how far the people are prepared to go with their revolt.
33. See id. at 9.
34. The apartheid regime declared a state of emergency on July 20, 1985 in major areas
of the country, including Johannesburg. See Nathaniel Sheppard Jr., S. Africa Releases Names
of Detainees, July 24, 1985, § 1, at 3. A key feature of the decree was the barring of all
journalists, television crews and other media representatives from the emergency areas. See
DION BASSON & HENNING VILOEN, SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 250-51 (1988).
35. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
36. The United Democratic Front was a multi-racial anti-apartheid coalition formed in
response to the adoption of a new constitution in 1983. See CATHOLIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS, SOUTH AFRICA IN THE i980S: STATE OF EMERGENCY 7 (1986) [hereinafter
CATHOLIC INSTITUTE]. Adopted pursuant to a whites-only referendum, the Constitution
denationalized the African population. See S. AFR. CONST. (Republic of South Africa Constitu-
tion Act, No. 110, 1983) at Part X para. 100(l)(ix). The Constitution also established segregat-
ed houses of Parliament for the "colored" and Indian people, id. at Part IV; and vested the State
President with potentially wide authoritarian powers, id. at Parts III para. 6(1); VI para. 30; V
paras. 19(l)(a) and (b); and IX para. 80.
37. According to the Detainees' Parents Support Committee, over 12,000 people were
detained between July 20, 1985 and March 31, 1986. In the same period, thirty-two activists
were charged with treason. See Detainees Parents Support Committee on Doubling of Detention
Rate in 1986, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Apr. 11, 1986, at § 4 available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File. By December, 1985, according to the Independent South
African Institute of Race Relations, nearly one-thousand people had been slain. See Arik
Bachar, South African Death Toll Now 1,000, Zimbabwe Border Tense, REUTERS N. EUR.
SERVICE, Dec. 17, 1985 available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
38. The term "Frontline States" refers to the independent black African states in the region
of southern Africa, including Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Zambia and Zimbabwe. See SADC Officials Discuss Regional Matters, XINHUA ENG.
NEWSWIRE, June 26, 1996 available in 1996 WL 10823044.
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Posing as a tourist, I obtain a seventy-two hour transit visa in
Swaziland, dispose of any telltale signs of my mission, memorize the
telephone number of my "contact," a prominent journalist, and go
"Inside." The atmosphere is very tense. Armored tanks rumble
through the black townships. In the city a political strike renders
blacks invisible on the streets, while white merchants aggressively
solicit patronage from me, an obvious foreigner. The people I
meet-without exception-tell me they are prepared to die for their
freedom.
The contrast now is striking. Johannesburg's streets surge with
African life, and very few whites can be seen downtown. I am told that
there are underground routes through which they can escape to the
suburbs. The bustle of daily life masks the tension caused by the
threatened Inkatha assault on the city.39 Things appear normal, except for
the razor-sharp wire barricading some sections of the city. In the suburbs
and townships, however, the mood is fearful. Everyone is planning to stay
home on Monday, the day Inkatha threatens to storm Johannesburg.
Inkatha has been violently opposed to the elections. 40 Only days before,
it led a group of axe-wielding impi warriors through the city, leaving
death and devastation in its wake. Inkatha openly trains "self-defense"
units in Ulundi.41
The Goldstone Commission confirmed the existence of hit squads in
the Natal Province, consisting of members of the Inkatha-dominated
KwaZulu police. 42 In March, the Commission reported that high-ranking
South African officials 43 assisted Inkatha in carrying out violent attacks
against the African National Congress (ANC)." Police officers testifying
39. The Inkatha party began as a Zulu cultural organization launched by Chief
Mangosuthu ("Gatsha") Buthelezi in 1975. Claiming about a million members, Inkatha followed
a policy of dialogue and collaboration with the apartheid regime, and frequently played a role
of violently disrupting the democratic movement. See CATHOLIC INSTITUTE, supra note 36, at
44-49.
40. On January 7, Inkatha announced that it would not participate in elections unless the
government and ANC acceded to "demands for greater autonomy." See LAWYERS' COMMITTEE
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, SOUTH AFRICA: THE COUNTDOWN TO ELECTIONS, Issue 4,
at 1 (Jan. 14, 1994) [hereinafter LAWYERS' COMMITTEE REPORT, Issue 4].
41. The capital of the KwaZulu "homeland."
42. See LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW REPORT, SOUTH AFRICA:
THE COUNTDOWN TO ELECTIONS, Issue 2, at 3 (Dec. 17, 1993) [hereinafter LAWYERS' COMMIT-
TEE REPORT, Issue 2].
43. General Basie Smit, the second-ranking commander of the South African police, and
General Krappies Engelbrecht, the chief of counter-intelligence, were named. See Zulu-Based
Group Sees a 'Dirty Trick' in Report by Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1994, at A9.
44. See id.
[Vol. 18:475
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before the Commission stated that from 1989 "until the very recent past,"
officials "oversaw a network that supplied automatic rifles, grenades,
mortars and other weapons to Inkatha."'45 Previous investigations have
disclosed government financing and training of Inkatha, 6 but this is the
first implication of them directly in the violence.
Nevertheless, in the liberal tradition, Inkatha will not be excluded
from the ballot;47 therefore, I must not judge the moral worth of the com-
peting parties, 48 so long as they follow the rules. Moral truth is unknow-
able; 49 indeed, moral judgments are inappropriate for enforcement through
law. 50 The veil screens out moral value judgments from the realm of
law. 511 must therefore avoid any "express preference for any named
groups. ' 52 My neutral role requires indifference to who the winner is.
53
Yet, this indifference masks the ultimate choice,54 which has already been
made."
45. Bill Keller, Inquest Finds South African Police Aided Zulus in Terror Campaign, N.Y.
TIMES, March 19, 1994 at AI.
46. In March, 1992, Buthelezi's former personal assistant testified that Inkatha members
received military training in Namibia, which was then under South African rule. David B.
Ottoway, Buthelezi Linked to Trainees; Inkatha Chief Signed Checks, Ex-Aide Says, WASH.
POST, March 1, 1992, at A23. Previously, the Weekly Mail disclosed that the government
secretly funded Inkatha rallies and an affiliated labor union. See David B. Ottoway, S. Africa
Probe Targets Inkatha, Alleged Fronts; Judge Says No Evidence Shows Pretoria Secretly
Funding Political Organizations, WASH. POST, February 5, 1992, at A23.
47. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
48. See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 19 ("Systems of ends are not ranked in value.").
49. See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REV. 781, 782 (1983) ("Liberalism's psychology posits
a world of autonomous individuals, each guided by his or her own idiosyncratic values and
goals, none of which can be adjudged more or less legitimate than those held by others.").
50. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 16, at 51 (suggesting that the current Supreme Court deems
Brown v. Board of Education ineffective as an enforcement tool because it is a mere "call to
higher morality").
51. See David Kennedy, Book Review, 21 HARv. INT'L L.J. 301, 304 (1980) (reviewing
Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE (2d ed.)(1979)) ("To the positivist ... law is an
expression of will, not right ... distinct from morality.").
52. Tushnet, supra note 49, at 806.
53. See Herbert Weschler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 11-12, 15 (1959).
54. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 3-4 (1988)
("[Liberalism's] requirement of disinterestedness in fact covertly presupposes one particular
partisan type of account of justice, that of liberal individualism, which it is later used to justify,
so that its apparent neutrality is no more than an appearance."). See also RAWLs, supra note
2, at 21.
55. See infra notes 200-21 and accompanying text.
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NEUTRALITY AS FIG-LEAF
The original position, however, does not entail a totally blank slate;
it is "characterized by stipulations that are widely accepted., 56 These
stipulations-individualism, private property, freedom of contract, the
patriarchal family-are the normative values and seemingly immutable
institutions of the market state.57 They are, by definition, neutral.58 Thus,
the original position presupposes that only liberal institutions, and the
prevailing distribution of power therein, are rational, and therefore form
the premises upon which rational men59 select and order principles of
justice.
Indeed, in Rawlsian discourse, justice and rationality are inter-
changeable. Justice is by definition rational;' rationality is intuitive61 and
efficient.62 The first principle of justice is, therefore, what is rational,
intuitive, and efficient in the context of the widely accepted stipulations
of liberalism: equal liberty.63 The principle of equal liberty-produced by
56. RAwLs, supra note 2, at 14. See also Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1971) (stating that majoritarianism is one such
stipulation).
57. See RAwLs, supra note 2, at 137. (In the original position, parties "understand political
affairs and the principles of [liberal] economic theory; they know the basis of social organiza-
tion [the market] and the laws of human psychology. Indeed, the parties are presumed to know
whatever general facts affect the choice of the principles of justice."). See also Chris Jochnick
& Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35
HARV. INT'L L.J. 49, 57 (1994) ("These effects are by their nature hidden; the contigent,
malleable power relations that produce law are made to seem natural, neutral, and inevitable.").
58. See Tushnet, supra note 49, at 824 ("Principles are 'neutral' only in the sense that they
are, as a matter of contingent fact, unchallenged, and the contingencies have obvious historical
limits.").
59. One commentator suggested that the concept "rational men" meant "the elites
throughout the system, including its periphery." Immanuel Wallerstein, Civilizations and Modes
of Production: Conflicts and Convergences, in CULTURE, IDEOLOGY, AND WORLD ORDER 66
(R.B.J. Walker ed., 1984).
60. See RAwLs, supra note 2, at 17.
61. See id. at 24 (suggesting that theories embodying rationality "have a deep intuitive
appeal."). But see MACINTYRE, supra note 7, at 67. ("[O]ne of the things that we ought to have
learned from the history of moral philosophy is that the introduction of the word 'intuition' by
a moral philcsopher is always a signal that something has gone badly wrong with the
argument.").
62. See RAwLs, supra note 2, at 14 (defining rationality as "taking the most effective
means to given ends").
63. See id. at 60 (defining the first principle of justice as providing "each person ... an
equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others").
Equal liberty thus prevails over countervailing conceptions of justice that might be "intuitive"
in the context of a different paradigm. For example, it is conceivable that equal distribution of
goods might be a paramount concern of a system of justice in a milieu characterized by
communitarianism, social ownership, or matriarchy.
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rationality and in turn producing justice-is one of the principles rational
men would consent to in a position of procedural equality.65
If parties are procedurally equal, the law and its implementers must
formally profess neutrality.' If I am to be neutral, the veil must block out
my Gaborone experience. I must also disavow sympathy with any of the
contending parties-the ANC, Inkatha, the separatist Afrikaner
Volksfront-or their ideologies, for partisanship is irrational, and by
definition cannot produce justice;
67 consequently, it is unjust.6 8
My task, therefore, is to superimpose rationality through law, in its
awesome universality and objectivity, 69 upon irrational politics, to mi-
raculously transform the events that are to transpire.70 In the hands of the
neutral arbiter, a cacaphonous struggle for power becomes a legal defin-
ing moment, law "act[ing] on the everyday as... order on chaos,"" . . .
as "the metropolis ... mobilized for deployment on the periphery. 72 Law
will bestow credibility and legitimacy upon the election and the resulting
political order. Once the political order is legitimated, its decisions will
acquire normative force,73 and an aura of inevitability will descend upon
its social and economic consequences. 74 In this way, the crucial dichoto-
my between law and politics will be preserved.75
64. See id. at 27. Rawls consistently "gender"alizes his predictions of outcomes under his
"justice as fairness" paradigm.
65. See generally id. at 12-14. But cf. Kennedy, supra note 51, at 301 ("While the
powerful of any ideological stripe will prefer a system of free bargaining among procedural
equals, this should never satisfy the weak.").
66. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 8, at 82.
67. See MACINTYRE, supra note 54, at 3.
68. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 273 (1974) ("To claim that a
prohibition or rule is nonneutral presupposes that it is unfair.").
69. See Weschler, supra note 53, at 15.
70. International observers were expected to observe all aspects of pre-election matters,
including organization, education initiatives, campaigning; observe the election procedure on
polling days and the counting of the ballots; attend political meetings and rallies; and observe
the conduct of the police and security forces. See Secretary General's Report, supra note 3, at
12, paras. 44-47.
71. See David Kennedy, Autumn Weekends: an Essay on Law and Everyday Life, in LAW
IN EVERYDAY LIFE 212 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993).
72. Id at 191.
73. See MARTII KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 56 (1989).
74. See Jochnick & Normand, supra note 57, at 57-58. "[L]aw influences the public
perception of an act by imbuing it with the psychic trappings of lawfulness .... Whereas
national law legitimates the domestic social order, the international legal regime reflects and
reifies the status, rights, and obligations of states. International law legitimates the hierarchies
through which power is presently distributed." Id. at 58 n.30 (citing GEORG SCHWARZEN-
BERGER, POWER POLITIcs: A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 203 (1951)).
75. See Weschler, supra note 53, at II (judicial criteria should be "criteria that can be
framed and tested as an exercise of reason and not merely as an act of willfuliness or will").
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I am, as well, the bearer of justice. Neutral law will ensure procedural
equality among the contenders. It will place the ruling National Party, the
architects of apartheid, and the formerly banned ANC on equal footing.
Law will render the previously disenfranchised blacks equal to the whites;
the veil will conceal the fact that it was only four months before that
blacks were given any say in the running of the country.76 Behind its lacy
folds, we are unaware that it was only four months ago that South
Africa's white-controlled parliament voted to restore citizenship to the
estimated ten million Africans banished to the barren, nominally indepen-
dent, "homelands. 77 But, the incisive words of W.E.B. DuBois penetrate
the veil:
Here, at a stroke of a pen was erected a government of millions of
men,-and not ordinary men either, but black men emasculated by
a peculiarly complete system of slavery, centuries old; ... they
come into a new birthright, at a time of war and passion, in the
midst of the stricken and embittered population of their former
masters.78
Nevertheless, liberal law renders the parties procedurally equal, and that
means that the process is fair. And procedural fairness means justice,79
despite the past and ongoing inequities.80 The veil of ignorance will
cancel out the advantages gained from differences in wealth, status,
military prowess, or racial and gender oppression.8 In this way, neutrality
constrains naked power.82
See also Kennedy, supra note 51, at 304 ("The triumph of positivism was accompanied by a
rigid separation of law and politics.").
76. Black South Africans were first given input with the launch of the Transitional
Executive Council (TEC). The Transitional Executive Council Act 151 of 1993 established the
TEC. The TEC consists of one member from each party represented in CODESA, and was
established to promote uninhibited canvassing, voter education and to eliminate impediments
to legitimate political activities. Although the TEC was merely an advisory body the interna-
tional community responded favorably to its formation. See LAWYERS' COMMITTEE REPORT,
Issue 2, supra note 42, at 1 ("The installation of the TEC [on December 6, 1993] triggered the
repeal. ... on December 9, of the United Nations oil embargo against South Africa.").
77. Id at 2. The law reinstating citizenship to the residents of Transkei, Venda,
Bophuthatswana and Ciskei was adopted on December 15, 1993.
78. W.E.B. DuBois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 29 (1968) (discussing circumstances
faced by newly emancipated slaves).
79. See RAwLS, supra note 2, at 136 ("The idea of the original position is to set up a fair
procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just.").
80. Id. at 140 (suggesting that what is just in the abstract will remain just once differences
surface).
81. Id at 18-19.
82. See Tushnet, supra note 49, at 783-84.
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And indeed, naked power must be constrained in certain contexts if
the law/politics dichotomy, hence the normative power of law, is to be
maintained.83 Power must be constrained in the judicial arena, the quintes-
sential legal forum, although neutral principles theorists acknowledge that
judicial decisionmakers face "inescapably 'political'" choices.4 In the
face of such choices, moral relativism is required, because liberal philoso-
phy deems these choices to be among equally worthy values, 5 reduced
to equally valid legal arguments.8 6 Liberal theorists advocate judicial
neutrality because the courts are not sovereign-they do not derive their
authority from popular consent-and therefore "are bound to function
otherwise than as a naked power organ" when making such choices.8,7
But, this reasoning does not apply to the political arena. The legislature
is sovereign, therefore it may behave in an overtly partisan fashion,88 and
any limits imposed on its authority bear a heavy burden of justification. 9
Likewise, in international law, neutrality does not delimit the State
when acting in its sovereign capacity; it is not imposed or expected when
States act to advance their economic, military, or diplomatic self-interests.
It does not apply to terms of trade, territorial defense, its votes in the
United Nations, IMF, GATT, or the World Bank. Neutrality is imposed,
however, when States act in a judicial capacity, resolving disputes be-
tween procedural equals. Thus, in the international arena, where it is
harder to conceal the influence of naked power, the veil is even more
important.' Naked power is irrational, and does not belong in a setting
83. See Dencho Georgiev, Politics or Rule of Law: Deconstruction and Legitimacy in
International Law, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1993).
84. See Weschler, supra note 53, at 15.
85. See id. Accordingly, Weschler characterized the issue in Brown v. Board of Education
not as equal protection, but freedom of association. Under this view, both sides had equally
valid moral positions with regard to the right to associate or not to associate. See id. at 34.
Similarly, Bork achieves neutrality by framing issues of rights as mere competing "gratifica-
tions," the worth of which is incapable of being judged. See Bork, supra note 56, at 10, 17.
86. See Kennedy, supra note 71, at 217 ("Mhe great claim of liberal legal science [is] to
have beaten the swords of political conflict into the ploughshares of argument.").
87. See Weschler, supra note 53, at 19. See also Bork, supra, note 56, at 6, 12. But cf.
MACINTYRE, supra note 7, at 235 ("[O]ne function of the Supreme Court [is] to keep the peace
between rival social groups adhering to rival and incompatible principles of justice by
displaying a fairness which consists in even-handedness in its adjudications.").
88. See Weschler, supra note 53, at 16 ("Is there not ... a vital difference between
legislative freedom to appraise the gains and losses in projected measures and the kind of
principled appraisal ... that alone is in the province of the courts?").
89. See Bork, supra note 56, at 10-11.
90. Anthony Carty, Critical International Law: Recent Trends in the Theory of Interna-
tional Law, 2 EUR. J.INT'L L. 66, 86 (1991) (stating that Maclntyre argues "that the very object
of the [liberal] exercise is to engage in a pretense of rationality so as to conceal the 'real'
forces at work in international society"). See generally MACINTYRE, supra note 7.
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where law and justice are the asserted goals. Neutral and objective rules
must constrain power and irrationality, or at least provide a fig-leaf in
which to clothe the beast.91
Sunday, April 17, 1994.
An ANC rally in a Johannesburg park-complete with reggae music
and tie-dyed hippies-reminds me of my youth in the anti-war and civil
rights movements. A meeting with a National Party Member of Parlia-
ment reminds me that what I am witnessing here is no ordinary transfer
of power, but a transition from fascism. Advocate Pienaar is a former
government official responsible for administering some of the worst
atrocities of apartheid. 92 As his aide serves us tea and cookies in the
plush, sunlit conference room, he explains that apartheid was a "mistake,"
an error of judgment, not a crime.93 The National Party has apologized,
he piquedly reminds us, and now the country must put the past behind it.
I am haunted, again, by Gaborone, by little Peter Mafoka's blood-
drenched pajamas. By Tim Williams' gaunt face as he describes his
narrow escape over a fence as his house is bombed. "You know,"
he shakes his head incredulously, "I lived there with three little
children." By the dismembered bodies of the two Batswana house-
keepers who were unlucky enough to move into a house recently
vacated by South African refugees. Two arms are found in the
debris, three legs. Bits of hair and scalp are scattered across the
lawn...
91. See Tushnet, supra note 49, at 825 ("The theory of neutral principles requires that
judges be able to rely on a shared conception of the proper role of judicial reasoning.").
92. Louis Pienaar was a former Minister of Home Affairs and Environment Affairs from
1991 to 1993 and a former Minister of National Education and Environmental Affairs from
1990 to 1992. In these capacitites, he was responsible for the hated system of inferior "Bantu
education" forced upon African youth. Interview with Louis A. Pienaar, Advocate, in Cape
Town, S. Afr. (Apr. 21, 1994). See also WHO'S WHO IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 1994-1995 377
(S. V. Hayes ed., 1995). Protest against this system had previously sparked the 1976 Soweto
uprising. See R. W. JOHNSON, How LONG WILL SOUTH AFRICA SURVIVE? 191-92 (1977).
Pienaar was also the last South African Administrator General of Namibia, during its illegal
occupation of that country. See ALLAN D. COOPER, THE OCCUPATION OF NAMIBIA 110 (1991)
(noting Pienaar's reduced role compared to previous Administrators General due to his position
in the Transitional Government of National Unity in Namibia). See also DENIS HERBSTEIN &
JOHN EVENSON, THE DEVILS ARE AMONG US 117, 179 (1989) (asserting incidents of Pienaar's
complicity in delaying Namibian independence and self-determination).
93. Apartheid has been declared a "crime against humanity" by the United Nations General
Assembly. G.A. Res. 2202, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2202/ (XXI)
(1966).
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But Pienaar says the veil will not be lifted in the interest of justice for
apartheid's victims: "Nuremberg-type trials will be resisted to the ut-
most!" he vows. Trying former officials for human rights violations
would "place a tension on the compromise that has been reached."
ENLIGHTENED NEUTRALITY
Neutrality's analogue in the contemporary international sphere is the
principle of nonintervention." As individuals are autonomous, states are
sovereign, free from domination by procedurally equal others.95 Sover-
eignty is at the heart of the post-Westphalian international order. From
the seventeenth century onward flowed the "individualistic notion of the
state as a mere sum total of individuals." 96 Locke situated States, like
individuals, in a state of nature,97 a state of freedom and equality9"
requiring consent to any limitations on their sovereignty. 99 Similarly,
Rousseau likened the State to the individual.' ° And behind the Rawlsian
veil of ignorance, States, too, would choose equal liberty.'
The philosophical parallels between classical international law and
Western liberal theory are rooted in history. 1°2 "[N]ot merely is ...
international law ... influenced by Western culture, but it is in fact itself
a part of that culture. 103 The sovereign nation-state and the autonomous
94. See ANTHONY CARTY, THE DECAY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW? A REAPPRAISAL OF THE
LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 88 (1986) (The prohibition of
intervention... is based on a pattern of domestic law analogy... to the same general, liberal
equation of relations between states to relations between individuals. Just as the treaty becomes
the contract of the middle-class world, and therefore central to a permanent international order,
so also states must have, as individuals, a sphere of activity which is sacrosanct.).
95. Under this framework, international legal theory may parallel what Tushnet theorizes
as "the atomistic premises of liberalism [that] treat each of us as autonomous individuals whose
choices and values are independent of those made and held by others." Tushnet, supra note 49,
at 805. See also, CARTY, supra note 94, at 90 ("A liberal-humanist insisted that human beings
are free from and equal to one another. There is no authority which allows anyone to coerce
another either for his own good or for some general or objective good.").
96. See JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 151 (1957).
97. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 437 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1963) (1960).
98. See id. at 309.
99. See id. at 375-76.
100. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 8, at 63.
101. See RAwLS, supra note 2, at 378-79.
102. See MACINTYRE, supra note 7, at 9 ("Doctrines, theses, and arguments all have to
be understood in terms of historical context.... So rationality itself, whether theoretical or
practical, is a concept with a history: indeed there are ... rationalities rather than rationality,
just as it will also turn out that there are justices rather than justice.").
103. CARTY, supra note 94, at 130.
Spring 1997]
Michigan Journal of International Law
individual were born at the same historical moment, the epoch that begins
in the 16th century °4 and culminated with the Enlightenment.
The theory of the Enlightenment was a revolutionary repudiation of
feudal philosophy and institutions which constituted barriers to incipient
capitalism. It exalted the idea of law as the product of rationality, rather
than of an ontological system. In order to ensure a decisive break from
feudalism, "the 'Law' of the Enlightenment dispenses with tradition and
history,"' 5 upon which feudal authority was based, and premises its
authority on the fiction of individual consent)°6 The normative values of
honor and loyalty which served the feudal hierarchy were replaced by
liberty and equality which serve the marketplace."°
The international principle of neutrality developed as part of the law
of war,108 a concession to commerce109 exacted by the growing strength
of the merchant class." 0 Neutrality enabled the non-belligerent to assert
its "right" to engage in commerce, free from the impediments of the war.
The publicists of the Enlightenment grounded the laws of war in rational-
ity."' Thus, moral relativism could be enlisted to preserve liberty; the
neutral State deemed the war to be just on both sides."'
Once neutrality was proclaimed, specific rights and obligations
attached. A neutral State was prohibited from delivering war matdriel to
the belligerents, and from allowing its territory to be used for war
preparation."' In exchange, there was a "presumption in favor of [the]
continued liberty" of the non-belligerents to engage in trade with other
States, as well as in non-military trade with the belligerents," 4 and the
neutral State maintained its right of territorial inviolability.
104. See R.B.J. Walker, East Wind, West Wind: Civilizations, Hegemonies, and World
Orders, in CULTURE, IDEOLOGY, AND WORLD ORDER, supra note 59, at 2.
105. CARTY, supra note 27, at 6. See also McINTYRE, supra note 7, at 335 (stating "the
project of founding a form of social order in which individuals could emancipate themselves
from the contingency and particularity of tradition by appealing to genuinely universal,
tradition-independent norms was and is ...the project of modem, liberal individualist society").
106. See Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 81, 82 (explaining that "[positivists] attribut[e] the force of law to historically specific
sovereign consent").
107. See KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, supra note 5.
108. See T. J. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 474-76 (1895).
109. See, e.g., In re Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (recognizing neutrality of coast
fishing vessels rendering them immune from capture as prizes of war under customary
international law). The case is also an antecedent to the acceptance of international human
rights laws as customary international law.
110. See LAWRENCE, supra note 108, at 557.
111. See Jochitick & Normand, supra note 57, at 61.
112. See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 73, at 125.
113. See LAWRENCE, supra note 108, at 474.
114. See id. at 475.
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The principle of neutrality in the law of war provides an intriguing
analogy for the liberal domestic sphere. The judge, as a neutral arbiter,
may not choose sides. She may not provide war materiel, that is, she may
not elect to apply legal principles that benefit one identified class of
litigants." 5 The neutral arbiter, however, may otherwise continue to
operate as if the war did not exist; thus, her territory will remain free
from attack.
1 6
Tuesday, April 19, 1994.
I am in training at the Independent Electoral Commission's (IEC)
headquarters, where I become acquainted with the elaborate legal
framework-legislation, agencies, and advisory commissions-put in
place to govern the election process." 7 A plethora of laws have been
hastily enacted, and institutions instantly created by the outgoing white
parliament to wallpaper over the longstanding violence and inequities.
The newly created structure has the awesome task of orchestrating a
free and fair election in four months. The IEC, which has the primary
responsibility for overseeing the April election,' including coordinating
and facilitating monitors' activities, holds its first meeting on December
115. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 8, at 82.
116. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 58-59 (1987) (explaining that task
of judicial arbiter is to preserve the institution of the judiciary).
117. See generally John Murphy et al., Postscript: The Legal Framework of South Africa's
First Democratic Election, in FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, supra note 4, at 241-52. The
Independent Electoral Commission Act 150 of 1993 established the IEC and the Special
Electoral Court (SEC). Additionally, Parliament enacted the Electoral Act of 1993, which
provides the operational framework for the IEC.
The Independent Media Commission Act 148 of 1993 established the Independent Media
Commission (IMC). The IMC is responsible for overseeing the equitable treatment of political
parties by broadcasting licensees, state-financed publications and information services during
the election period. The IMC's power is limited to "consulting" with broadcast licensees. The
Independent Broadcasting Authority Act 153 of 1993 established the Independent Broadcasting
Authority (IBA). The IBA has the authority to regulate broadcasting to ensure a diverse range
of news.
The Sub-Council on Law and Order, Stability and Security and the Sub-Council on
Defence have the responsibility to establish a National Peacekeeping Force. The Sub-Council
on Intelligence is empowered to monitor and liase with intelligence services country-wide.
118. See LAWYERS' COMMITEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, SOUTH AFRICA: THE
COUNTDOWN TO ELECTIONS, Issue 3, at 1 (Dec. 31, 1993) [hereinafter LAWYERS' COMMITTE
REPORT, Issue 3]. See Murphy et al., supra note 4, at 249. The IEC's specific madate was to
(1) administer, organize, supervise and conduct the elections; (2) promote conditions conducive
to free and fair elections; (3) determine and certify the results and fairness of the elections; and
(4) conduct voter education and enforce regulations. Id. at 245. Significantly, the IEC's
certification of the election results is final and unappealable. Id. The IEC Act also established
various independent tribunals, including the Special Electoral Court (SEC), and an elaborate
hearings, appeal and review system. Id. at 247. Section 36 maintains that standing to invoke
an appeal will be granted to parties, candidates or any interested person. Id. at 248.
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20, 1993.119 Under the new regime IEC decisions will prevail over
conflicting local, common or customary laws.12
Thus, law will once again effect the triumph of reason over barbarity.
The universalizing force of law will transform apartheid, recreating it as
civilized democracy.121 It is archetypical law expressing the new reality
of ruling interests;122 law as inscriber of the new ideological conven-
tion; 123 law as preserver of the status quo.'2 It is the stuff of which the
veil is made. The veil will sweep away the outmoded legal obstacles of
the past, permitting justice to take place.
Friday, April 22, 1994.
Greenmarket Square is a picturesque little section of Capetown, an
open air crafts market surrounded by shops and restaurants. It is fre-
quented by roving bands of street youth from the "colored" townships
encircling the city, boys as young as seven or eight. The ragged, dirty-
faced urchins extend plaintive fingers to me as I sit in an outdoor cafe.
"Don't give them money," someone cautions. "They'll buy glue to sniff."
So I offer one of them a piece of my sandwich, and am touched when he
begins to share it with the others. Suddenly, a police van appears, slowing
down at the curb. The sandwich falls to the ground as they scatter like so
many stray cats, only to gather back together on the other side of the
square when the van has disappeared.
I am the reification12- of neutrality: the liberal paradigm; the denial
that 'neutral intervention' is an oxymoron. The veil is proof that the law
119. See LAWYERS' COMMITTEE REPORT, Issue 3, supra note 118, at 1. The Lawyers'
Committee served as the chief coordinator of U.S. NGO delegations.
120. See Murphy et al., supra note 4, at 252. The Act also specifies who may participate
in the elections, how participation is to be effected, and the organization of electoral processes.
Id. at 252-55. Participating parties are required to abide by the Electoral Code contained in
schedule two of the Interim Constitution. Id. at 253. The Act's provisions are enforceable by
the Electoral Tribunals set up by the IEC Act. Id.
121. See Carty, supra note 27, at 22.
122. See BELL, supra note 16, at 94.
123. The aura of legitimacy that law embodies enables its ideological role, that of
"impress[ing] upon people a sense of obligation to the existing order." See Jochnick &
Normand, supra note 57, at 57.
124. See BELL, supra, note 16, at 66-67.
125. See Carty, supra note 90, at 67 n.1 ("Reification means ... to consider ... an
abstract idea or concept real or concrete.").
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I am to implement is derived from the sovereign consent of the parties.
12 6
Consent to my presence attests to the legality, and inherent justice of my
intervention.' 27 Since my intervention is lawful and just, rational beings
would consent to the conception of the good which it will impose. 2 ' This
conception will not be a foreign. model; the application of neutral rules
will permit the maintenance of the fundamental status quo, the "continua-
tion of [the] previously existing state."129 Indeed, the maintenance of
formal neutrality will actively lock in the prevailing relations of power,
because in the context of conflict, preserving the status quo inherently
disadvantages the weaker party. For example, the imposition of a "neu-
tral" arms embargo on both sides to a conflict, when one party is already
heavily armed, preserves the military balance of power."
Consensually 3' and justly, South Africa's "appropriate distributive
shares" in the free market 132 will be ensured. The immutable institutions
of liberalism-individualism, private property, freedom of contract,
monogamy133--can now take firm hold, unimpeded by the anachronisms
of apartheid. This will guarantee the continued economic dominance of
the white minority, 34 and the country's subordinate place in the global
economy, its future tied to foreign investment. 135 The investment climate
126. Id. at 69 (Liberal discourse "drives to cover over difference and to insist upon the
homogeneity of all experience, resulting in a contrived consensus.").
127. See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 27.
128. See MACINTYRE, supra note 54, at 336 ("[L]iberal individualism does indeed have
its own broad conception of the good, which it is engaged in imposing politically, legally,
socially, and culturally wherever it has the power to do so.").
129. See LAWRENCE, supra note 108, at 474 ("Neutrality is in a sense the continuation of
a previously existing state.").
130. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 3009th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doe.
S/RES/713 (1991) (imposing an embargo on all weapon and military equipment deliveries to
all of Yugoslavia).
131. In its first session, the TEC ratifies the pre-existing international intervention,
adopting a resolution "requesting that the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the European
Community, the Organization of African Unity and individual governments provide election
observers..." See LAWYERS' COMMITTEE REPORT, Issue 2, supra note 42, at 3. "The TEC also
... appeal[s] to the UN to coordinate all international observers." ld. at 4.
132. See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 6 (discussing the "distinctive role of conceptions of
justice ... [as] ... specify[ing] basic rights and duties and to determine the appropriate
distributive shares").
133. See id. at 7.
134. In a nation of forty-three million, South Africa's five million whites boast per capita
incomes eight times higher than blacks. See Lynne Duke, White S. Africans Fear Their Fates
in a Black Nation, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 2, 1996, at A26.
135. Sub-Saharan Africa is heavily dependent on capital from foreign governments to meet
its resource needs. See ZIA GURESHI, GLOBAL CAPITAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND: Is THERE
ENOUGH TO GO AROUND? 11 (The World Bank ed., 1996). "Saving rates in... Sub-Saharan
Africa, averaging. . . [only] 16 percent of GDP,. . . are among the lowest [in the world,] and
have declined over the past decade." Id. at 8. The World Bank forecasts a coming scarcity of
official capital, thus requiring these countries to attract private investment. Id. at 11. Unlike the
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will take priority over the needs of the impoverished black majority,136
and business will proceed as usual.
t37
Saturday, April 23, 1994.
"[Aind gaunt Hunger wept beside Bereavement. 138
Crossroads. It is inconceivable to me that people can live under such
conditions. In this notorious legacy of apartheid's forced removal policy'
39
outside Capetown, row upon row of makeshift tin and plastic shacks lean
against one another in a poignant effort of solidarity. No running water.
No electricity. No toilets. Not a blade of grass or tree in sight. Miles from
the "white" metropolitan areas.
I am here to observe "Operation Access," an IEC program designed
to ensure that voters are exposed to a variety of political views. We arrive
in a convoy of large white vans called "Koombis." The commando raid
on Gaborone was conducted in similar vehicles. Our convoy forms a
protective semi-circle around spokesmen for the African Christian
Democratic Party and Inkatha Freedom Party as they address the sparse
unsympathetic crowds under the watchful eyes of "peace monitors."
Crossroads is considered a "no go" area; several thousand people were
killed in political violence here last year, and local "defense units" resist
any incursions into the community. I note some sporadic booing and
name-calling when a white member of the Zulu-nationalist Inkatha, in
rest of the region, however, South Africa is able to attract significant private capital, due to its
vast natural wealth and the accumulated wealth of the white minority.
136. Although South Africa is classified as an "upper middle income country," just under
forty-six percent of the population lives in poverty. Norman Chandler, Plotting S Africa's
Patterns of Poverty, THE STAR INTERNATIONAL WEEKLY, June 15, 1995 at 11. This includes
more than half the African people (57.2 percent), who account for seventy-five percent of the
population; nearly one-fifth of the "colored" population (19.8 percent) and just under seven
percent of Asians, compared to only two percent of whites. Id. (graph). Also, nearly eight
million blacks are homeless. See Suzanne Daley, South Africa Losing Fight to House Homeless,
N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1996, at A10.
137. See Editorial, After Mr. Mandela, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1996, § 4, at A12.
138. DuBois, supra note 78, at 33.
139. This policy was carried out pursuant to the Group Areas Act, adopted by the National
Party in 1950. The Act empowered government officials to designate any area in South Africa
as an ethnic area in which specific groups could be placed. See, e.g., Christopher Munnion,
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 2, 1991, at 12. Its purpose was to remove the black majority from the
centers and residential districts of urban areas, and resettle them in the "homelands" or in
"locations" on the periphery of urban areas. The displaced populations remain accessible to the
"white" towns, to which they commute for employment. About three and a half million people
were forcibly removed between 1960 and 1982. See CATHOLIC INSTITUTE, supra note 36, at
15.
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camouflage fatigues, advocates "separate development," the motto of the
apartheid era. Otherwise, the event takes place without incident.
In July 1992, the United Nations Security Council unanimously
adopted resolution 765, establishing a "National Peace Accord" for South
Africa."4 It was an attempt to render the political climate sufficiently
calm to conduct a credible election.1 41 According to a United Nations
Mission visiting the country in the weeks prior to the election, however,
the Accord is ineffective, and widespread political intolerance, fear,
intimidation and violence are on the rise.
142
Right-wing paramilitary groups are reportedly stockpiling weapons
obtained through neighboring Swaziland and Mozambique despite
government and police claims of stepped up border controls.143 Moreover,
the Mission reports that South Africa's attempt to create a National
Peace-Keeping Force (NPKF) is not progressing well.' 44 Previously,
observers from the Commonwealth publicly expressed doubts over the
prospects for the establishment of an effective peacekeeping force by the
April elections. In a report issued by the Commonwealth Mission last
December, observers note that substantial time is necessary to train a
force that will be drawn from so many diverse sources, and cite the
brevity of the pre-election period as a major obstacle to the timely and
effective deployment of such a force. 45 Chaos reigns in the violence-
stricken areas where the NPKF is hastily deployed. South African press
reports cite inadequate training and logistical support as factors in the
NPKF's inability to maintain order.
46
140. See S.C. Res. 765, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3096th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. SIRES/765
(1992).
141. The Resolution resulted in the establishment of the United Nations Organization
Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) in September, 1992, which began to deploy observers to
oversee the process of preparing for the elections. A date was set a year later, in July 1993, for
an election to be held nine months hence. See Edmund T. Piasecki, Africa, in A GLOBAL
AGENDA: ISSUES BEFORE THE 48TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 56, 59-60
(John Tessitore & Susan Woolfson eds., 1993).
142. See Letter Dated 31 March 1994, supra note 26, at 8, para. 29.
143. See id. at 8 para. 31.
144. See id. at 9 para. 34.
145. See LAWYERS' COMMITTEE REPORT, Issue 2, supra note 42, at 3.
146. See, e.g., Chris Louw, Experts Warned that NPKF Wasn't Ready, THE WKLY. MAIL
& GUARDIAN, April 22, 1994, at 14.
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As the elections approach the violence escalates. "We do not come
from a democratic tradition," one new voter will observe as she awaits
her turn to cast a ballot. "I expect that we'll be on a learning curve for
about the next five years."
Each bold step toward democracy has been accompanied by an
intensification of violent resistance. The endorsement of the Interim
Constitution in December coincides with a forty-three percent increase in
deaths attributable to political violence across the country. According to
the Johannesburg-based Human Rights Commission (HRC), 109 deaths
are reported that week. 147 There is evidence that local ANC leaders are
being targeted. 48 The chairperson of a Northern Natal branch is mur-
dered; during the following week nine ANC supporters are murdered in
squatter camps on the outskirts of Durban. 49 The violence is linked to
government sources. Security force members are identified in half of all
political violence incidents where the perpetrator is identifiable; close to
forty South Africans die in police custody in the first eleven months of
1993.150
Leaflets are distributed in affluent white communities which are
passed off as ANC campaign material. One such leaflet claims that "'all
public service posts will be replaced by comrades,' that no ammunition
would be available to whites and [that] health institutions would be
'Africanized' and whites would be required to pay according to their
income. The leaflet ends with the slogan, 'Viva! Kill a Boer,' 5' kill a
farmer!' The ANC [calls] the leaflet a 'desperate attempt to discredit
us.' ,152
South Africa's Parliament adopts the Interim Constitution on De-
cember 22, 1993.1 3 On December 24, a personal assistant to an ANC
leader is assassinated by unknown gunmen. 54 In Natal, political violence
147. See LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, SOUTH AFRICA: THE
COUNTDOWN TO ELECTIONS, Issue 1, at 4 (Dec. 3, 1993) [hereinafter LAWYERS' COMMITTEE
REPORT, Issue 1].
148. The execution of key ANC leaders was a longstanding strategy of the regime. In the
1980's a number of exiled anti-apartheid activists such as Dr. Ruth First were assassinated by
letter-bombs. See Paul Taylor, S. Africa's Past Honors Pose Questions About Future Justice,
WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1995, at Al, A22. After returning from exile, militant leader Chris Hani
was assassinated at his home on April, 1993. See Paul Taylor, Apartheid Foe Slain in S. Africa,
WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1993, at Al. There were also many other unsuccessful attempts.
149. See LAWYERS' COMMITTEE REPORT, Issue 1, supra note 147, at 2.
150. See id.
151. The word boer literally means farmer, but it has acquired a pejorative connotation
in reference to Afrikaners. See SOUTH AFRICA: A COUNTRY STUDY 439 (Harold D. Nelson ed.,
1981).
152. LAWYERS' COMMITTEE REPORT, Issue 1, supra note 147, at 4-5.
153. S. AFR. CONST. (Act No. 200 of 1993).
154. See LAWYERS' COMMITTEE REPORT, Issue 3, supra note 118, at 2.
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is responsible for at least thirty-two deaths between December 22 and
27.155 Nationwide, political violence results in seventy-four deaths,
compared to fifty-eight the previous week.'56 The white right-wing
Conservative Party declares that the "Orange Free State province [will]
resist, by force if necessary,.inclusion into a unified South Africa." The
Afrikaners People's Front also announces its intention to establish a white
people's State, complete with alternative government structures. 157 On
December 27, the South African Police withdraw regular police units
from the impoverished Alexandra township, replacing them with members
of the notorious Internal Stability Unit (ISU), which has frequently been
accused of fomenting political violence. The ISU patrols the black
townships with heavily armed vehicles.
158
The Afrikaanse Protestante Church whose members include leaders
from the Conservative Party and Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging
(Afrikaner Resistance Movement) announces that its members are
responsible for recent bombings, and makes threats against voter edu-
cation workers. Church officials warn that only when the April election
is called off will they direct their members to stop their acts of vio-
lence.
159
At the Transitional Executive Council's (TEC) meeting on January
11, 1994,160 the escalating political violence, including the murder of a
photo-journalist by Inkatha supporters during an attack on ANC members,
heads the agenda.' 6' A confrontation develops between the government
and the TEC regarding the authority to deploy security forces into
KwaZulu; there is a fundamental disagreement over the nature and scope
of TEC authority. According to the government, "the TEC is an advisory
body only and does not have the power to issue directives."'
162
In one weekend in February forty-five people are killed in the volatile
Natal province. Twelve children and two adults are killed during a
155. See LAWYERS' COMMITTEE REPORT, Issue 3, supra note 118, at 3.
156. See LAWYERS' COMMITTEE REPORT, Issue 2, supra note 42, at 2.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, SOUTH AFRICA: THE
COUNTDOWN TO ELECTIONS, Issue 7, at 3 (Feb. 25, 1994) [hereinafter LAWYERS' COMMITTEE
REPORT, Issue 7].
160. See LAWYERS' COMMITTE REPORT, Issue 4, supra note 40, at 1.
161. See id.
162. Id. See also supra note 76 and the accompanying text. Ironically, upon the establish-
ment of the TEC, Nelson Mandela urged the United Nations to lift sanctions against the regime.
See Nelson Mandela, Address to the Special Committee against Apartheid, U.N. GAOR, 48th
Sess., 669th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/AC/i 15/SR.669 (1993). Shortly thereafter, Commerce Secretary
Ron Brown led a delegation of U.S. businessmen to South Africa. See, e.g., Clinton Signs
Measure Lifting Sanctions Against South Africa, Sends Trade Mission, 10 INT'L TRADE REP.
2006 (Dec. 1, 1993).
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midnight attack; the group had come to Natal from a rural village to
attend a voter education workshop scheduled for the following day. 163 A
state of emergency is declared in Natal.
ANC supporters [are] the victims in more than half of the 77 deaths
recorded by HRC between March 30th and April 5th .... Accord-
ing to a Reuters news report, Ill people [are] killed in political
violence in Natal between Thursday, April 1st and Wednesday,
April 6th. In the 24 hour period between April 5th and 6th alone, 23
people died, making that period one of the deadliest of the past four
years."6
Evidence is found of South African government efforts to prevent
eligible voters from obtaining the necessary documentation to vote. The
torn-up remnants of completed ID applications submitted by residents of
Lenasia, a squatter camp near Johannesburg, are found in a dumpster
behind a branch office of the Department of Home Affairs. Most resi-
dents of Lenasia are ANC supporters. Original birth certificates and
photographs of the applicants are also found in the dumpster.
165
Monday, April 25, 1994.
It is the day before the elections. "BOMBERS STRIKE AGAIN"
proclaim two-inch high headlines, towering above a photograph of
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, his head bowed in prayer.16 Eight people are
killed when a car bomb explodes at a crowded taxi stand in a black area,
one of nine bombings in the country within twenty-four hours. 167 Neo-
Nazi whites are reportedly beating up blacks on their way to a political
rally to be addressed by Winnie Mandela.'6 Six polling stations are
bombed, and a car bomb kills nine people near the ANC headquarters in
central Johannesburg, 69 which I had visited only a few days before.
Susan Keane, a white ANC candidate for Parliament, is among the
163. See LAWYERS' COMMITTEE REPORT, Issue 7, supra note 159, at 2.
164. LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, SOUTH AFRICA: THE COUNT-
DOWN TO ELECTIONS, Issue 10, at 4 (Apr. 8, 1994).
165. See LAWYERS' COMMITTEE REPORT, Issue 7, supra note 159, at 3.
166. THE ARGUS, April 25, 1994, at 1.
167. See 8 Died in Second Car Bomb on Reef, THE ARGUS, Apr. 25, 1994, at 1 [hereinaf-
ter THE ARGUS].
168. See Winnie Cancels Rally, THE ARGUS, Apr. 25, 1994, at 1.
169. See THE ARGUS, supra note 167, at 1.
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victims.170 Archbishop Tutu vows that the elections will not be derailed:
"We are going to vote and elections are going to be free and fair."'
7'1
"FREE AND FAIR" AS A NEUTRAL CONSTRUCT
The concept of free and fair elections applies the theory of neutrality
to the electoral context. "Free and fair" embodies the "acceptable rules of
bargaining"'' 7  in the quintessential majoritarian forum, emphasizing
procedural equality, hence fairness and justice in the liberal sense. Its
standards-universal and equal suffrage, secret ballot, and non-discrimi-
nation 173-promote liberalism's normative value of equal liberty. Liber-
alism's moral relativism is enshrined in the principle of free choice.
Parties and policies are equally valid, provided they are within the
previously drawn parameters. 174 The realization of individual
autonomy-freedom to associate in political parties and to propagate
policies of one's choice-completes the panoply of preferences that
liberalism provides.
75
Although neutrality suggests restraint from choice, it does not mean
value-free. 176 Through even-handed application of these neutral procedural
standards, the values inherent in the liberal "conception of the
good"-embodied in the power-sharing paradigm177-are to be
170. See ANC's 'Unselfish' Susan Dies in Friend's Arms, THE ARGUS, Apr. 25, 1994, at
23.
171. Tutu Callsfor Calm in Face of Violence, THE ARGUS, Apr. 25, 1994, at 1.
172. MACINTYRE, supra note 54, at 337 (arguing that "liberal modernity" requires such
bargaining within society to determine the proper allocation of resources to diverse and
competing spheres in which societal "good" may be pursued).
173. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 30, at 570, 590. See also, Pierre de Vos et al., Introduction-
Free and Fair Elections, in FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, supra note 4, at xxi. (free election
means that every citizen should be able to express his or her choice of party or candidate
[autonomy], while fairness demands that each party should have equal opportunity [equal
liberty] to win the support of the electorate. According to South Africa's pro-democracy forces,
"[a] national election ... [is 'free and fair'] only when it is clearly devoid of fraud, rigging,
voter coercion or violence ... by secret balloting and an absence of constraints on the freedom
of" association and assembly. Id. at 212.
174. See RAwLs, supra note 2, at 138 ("In arguing for a conception of justice we must be
sure that it is among the permitted alternatives . )..."). See also MACINTYRE, supra note 54,
at 336.
175. See MACINTYRE, supra note 7, at 336.
176. See Miller & Howell, supra note 6, at 664-67 (stating that abstract principles cannot
be neutral, and all decisional knowledge involves value judgments. "mhe personal factor
manifest[s] itself... wherever there is an act of appraisal, choice, or accreditation").
177. See infra notes 206-220 and accompanying text.
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implemented. 171 Procedural neutrality will transform an arranged marriage
into a consensual union that comports with modem justice.
"Free and fair," like procedural equality generally, is not a dynamic
concept. It rejects the viewing of events through an historical lens,
focusing instead on a snap-shot in time, a freeze-frame that extends from
the commencement of the campaign to the tallying of the votes,'7 9 as if
"choice" only takes place (and can only be influenced) during the cam-
paign or at the polls. This reasoning is consistent with the notion of
justice in liberal discourse as an abstract concept, something other than
what happens in everyday life.80
The freezing of the moment facilitates the fictions of liberalism,
allowing them to approximate reality.'' A living, breathing, moving
process becomes a series of still images, not necessarily related to each
other, and capable of varying, even contradictory interpretations.8 2 A still
photo does not disclose what came before, or what is to follow. Thus,
moral relativism becomes defensible and equality seems believable. The
intense governmental repression and State-sponsored violence (suspended
during the voting) can be forgotten in the exuberance of the moment. The
National Party's access to vast government resources, compared to the
opposition's lack of resources and skills, 18 3 may not seem significant; the
erosion of ballot secrecy caused by the high illiteracy rate becomes
invisible. Prisoners and their jailors are one. For the frozen moment
allows us to turn "from substance to process, from reality to rhetoric.' 8 4
178. See Tushnet, supra note 49, at 823 (arguing that judges do not proceed strictly from
neutral principles but from a background of societal values that delimit the acceptable policies
produced by neutral principles alone).
179. See, e.g., Pierre de Vos et al., Introduction-Free and Fair Elections, in FREE AND
FAIR ELECTIONS, supra note 4, at xxii (stating that "[v]otes can be freely cast only where a free
exercise of choice is possible. No undue influence should be brought to bear on voters during
the campaign") (emphasis added).
180. See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 35. See also C. Garrison Lepow, Deconstructing Los
Angeles or a Secret Fax from Margritte Regarding Postliterate Legal Reasoning, 26 UNIV.
MICH. J.L. REFORM, 69, 99-100 (1992) ("[H]uman conflict is merely tangential to the abstract
issues of the law. The causes of conflict, and the aftermath of the solution (perhaps continued
conflict), generally are not relevant to the holding of the case.").
181. See Martin Marieta Co. v. Gould Inc., 70 F.3d 768, 771 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that
a fiction "is given life so long as common experience supports its application").
182. See Lepow, supra note 180, at 75-76 (discussing defense counsels' use of videotape
in Rodney King police brutality trial).
183. The South African press reported that "the ANC [was] struggling to finance the
critical last 10 weeks of its ... campaign." LAWYERS' COMMITTEE REPORT, Issue 7, supra note
159, at 3.
184. See Kennedy, supra note 71, at 217.
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But for the veil, I would cry out, in the spirit of Galileo's retort about
the Earth: "But it does move! "185
But the snapshot represents the dominant discourse, and outcomes are
validated when the frozen images reflect a procedurally "free and fair"
contest. 8 6 Liberal philosophy even recognizes an acceptable level of un-
fairness. Thus, the theory of neutrality serves yet another purpose, that of
attempting to "reduce the risk of arbitrariness to an acceptable level."' 187
Fraud should not be too blatant or too obvious. Acceptability is an
indeterminate, malleable concept. In the South African context, violence
has become a "widely accepted stipulation" in the Rawlsian sense, such
that the mere reduction of violent disruptions in connection with the
actual polling becomes prima facie evidence of fairness. 88
Tuesday, April 26, 1994.
While baby Nelson is awaiting her arrival, I am traveling to
Pollsmoor Prison, just a few miles away, where her namesake had been
housed for many years. He was transferred there from notorious Robben
Island 89 when the regime, daunted by massive popular uprisings, and the
imposition of economic sanctions, sought to begin talks with the opposi-
tion. It is rumored that the move was necessary because his fellow activ-
ists on the Island objected to negotiating while the people were engaged
in revolt. Mandela was subsequently transferred to a more amiable set-
ting, a warden's home on the edge of Victor Verster Prison, where he
was to engage in years of negotiations with apartheid leaders on the
transition to majority rule. 90
185. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 161 (16th ed. 1992) (attributed to Galileo
by Abb Irailh in QUERELLES LITTrIRAmES (1761), alleging that at his Inquisition Galileo whis-
pered, "E pur si muove!" after recanting his claim that the earth revolved around the sun).
186. Even UNOMSA's guarded declaration that the election was "substantially" free and
fair was enough. Unwilling to take any risks of violent rejection of the results, however,
Mandela permitted blatant fraud to go unchallenged and, in a gesture of "reconciliation,"
awarded Cabinet seats to parties which had not attained the minimum threshold of votes. See
Secretary General's Report, supra note 4, at 14; Michael Holman & Mark Suzman, Mandela
Creates Cabinet for Unity, FIN. TIMES, May 7, 1994, at 1, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Arcnws File.
187. Tushnet, supra note 49, at 805 (discussing the neutral theory that asserts that a
requirement of consistency reduces arbitrariness).
188. See Secretary General's Report, supra note 4, at 1-5.
189. See generally INDRES NAIDOO, PRISONER 885/63, ISLAND IN CHAINS (1982) (present-
ing a moving description of this infamous Robben Island Prison).
190. The regime's first overture to Mandela came in 1984, following the imposition of
economic sanctions. Clandestine negotiations between Mandela and apartheid officials began
in the summer of 1986, during a brutal government crackdown on pro-democracy forces, as
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Now the overwhelmingly black male prison population gathers in
orderly fashion to exercise, for the first time, its newly won franchise.
Only yesterday, the government announced that prisoners-with the
exception of those serving sentences for murder, rape, or armed rob-
bery-would be allowed to vote.' 9 "How does it feel?" I query. "Well,
all right," is the understated reply. Later, an ANC monitor 92 is less
restrained: "When I saw the first prisoner cast his vote, I wanted to cry."
The veil muffles my response, for I am the "ideal observer:" neutral,
impartial.'93 I am legitimate.94 My presence legitimates.
In democratic theory an election legitimates power. 95 To the dem-
ocratic forces of South Africa, I am there as a "watchdog"-to "ensure
compliance with international standards," to establish "public confidence
and trust" in the elections.' 96 It is their hope that I will contribute to the
creation of a "climate in which national reconciliation and reconstruction
can take place."' They hope that I will ensure a patently legitimate
transfer of power.
Voters will select from nineteen political parties, giving the election
the appearance of being broadly democratic, and enabling the expression
thousands of anti-apartheid activists languished in detention. See Patrick Collings, Profile of
Nelson Mandela, U.P.I., May 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
191. See Brendan Boyle, S. Africa's Robben Island Prisoners Vote, REUTERS N. AM.
WIRE, Apr. 26, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
192. See Secretary-General's Report, supra note 4, at 12 ("Registered political parties
were entitled to appoint voting agents to monitor the conduct of the election at the voting
stations and the counting process.").
193. Cf. Ruth Wedgewood, The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping, 28 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 631, 632 (1995) (using the term "ideal observer" to describe an impartial non-party
in the context of a multilateral decision).
194. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 49, at 807. (stating that the neutral principles theory"ultimately rests on the claim that, without neutrality, a decision 'wholly lack[s] legitimacy"').
195. This view is reflected in article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which establishes the will of the people as the basis of governmental authority. G.A. Res. 217
(III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 75, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). See also U.N. Convention on
Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 6 I.L.M.
368 (article 25 embraces the right to participatory government); Fox, supra note 30, at 604-605
(stating that "[e]lections provide an empirical test of the right of an incumbent government to
exercise power"). See, e.g., FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, supra note 4.
196. See Medard Rwelamira & David Ailola, International Monitoring of Free and Fair
Elections, in FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, supra note 4, at 212.
197. Id. at 237. South Africa's Multi-party Negotiating Council (CODESA) strongly
supported international involvement in South Africa's transition. See id. at 223-24. CODESA
called upon the United Nations to coordinate the activities of international observer missions
of the Commonwealth, the European Union and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). See
Secretary-General's Report, supra note 4, at 31.
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of a wide range of permissible preferences.1 98 The election, however, is
preceded by multi-party negotiations, which have already defined the
parameters of power for the soon to be elected government.199 These
negotiations constitute, in essence, the sovereign, "legislative" process
which is absolved from the neutrality requirement.' Looming over the
talks is the double-edged threat of civil war from black tribalists2 ' and
white separatists °-both linked to the regime-and the ever watchful
eyes of foreign investors.
There was tremendous pressure on the ANC leadership to abandon
the liberation demands of the Freedom Charter,21 3 which had been its
guiding platform since 1956, opting instead for a "civil rights" model.
"The de Klerk government, the country's four gigantic business con-
glomerates, the IMF and the World Bank, and virtually all Western
governments were preaching free-market economics and urging
privatization of South Africa's scores of state-owned companies." 2 4 Pre-
paring to take the reins of a crumbling economy, the ANC succumbed to
the pressure.
The result is power sharing,206 a compromise among parties proce-
durally equal, but vastly unequal in terms of real power. Power sharing
198. See generally MACINTYRE, supra, note 54, at 336 (discussing preferences and individ-
ual expression).
199. The regime commenced informal talks with Nelson Mandela while he was still
imprisoned. Shortly after his release, in May 1990, the regime and the ANC held their first
meeting. In December, 1991, formal talks about the transition began (CODESA I). See Ibrahim
J. Gassama, Reaffirming Faith in the Dignity of Each Human Being: The United Nations, NGOs
and Apartheid, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1464, 1512-13, n.222 (1996) (discussing the negotia-
tions and the process of international legitimization of the negotiations strategy).
200. See Weschler, supra note 53; Bork, supra note 56.
201. See, e.g., Donatella Lorch, Arms Ban is Defied at Rally by Zulu Party, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 6, 1994, at A13.
202. See, e.g., Bill Keller, Mixed Signals Fatal for South African Separatists, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 12, 1994, at A3.
203. The Freedom Charter was adopted at the historic Congress of the People at Kliptown,
South Africa on June 26, 1956. The Preamble made the revolutionary pronouncement that:
South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government
can claim authority unless it is based on the will of the people.
The Charter called for democracy, equality, and redistribution of the land and resources of
South Africa. See NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM 197-98 (1994) (discussing
the growth of the Pan Africanist Congress in 1959, which opposed the message of racial
cooperation promoted by the ANC and underlying the Charter).
204. DAVID OTrAWAY, CHAINED TOGETHER: MANDELA, DE KLERK, AND THE STRUGGLE
TO REMAKE SOUTH AFRICA 85 (1993).
205. See id. at 85-86.
206. The "power-sharing" concept had its genesis in the talks between Mandela and
apartheid leaders. These discussions were initiated without any consultation with the rest of the
ANC leadership. See id. at 25-29. Mandela later proposed the power-sharing approach to the
ANC in July 1991. See id. at 163.
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as the conception of the good resolves the ultimate constitutive questions
facing the new nation, decisions which "govern the fundamental
organisation of a state ... and determine fundamental allocations of
values among its peoples."'  Power sharing means that majority rule will
be delayed. It means civil rights, not economic justice; emphasis on
investment, not peoples' needs; amnesty, not justice; continuation, not
transformation. Power sharing appears also to have been tacitly under-
stood to limit the number of votes and provinces the ANC would be
allowed to win. It thus created an inherent contradiction in the democratic
process; the implementation of power sharing constituted a substantive
rule under which the parties operated, a rule which countenanced--even
required-massive violations of the procedural rules.
Power sharing means that South Africa will remain on the periphery
of the world economy. By moving decisively away from apartheid, and
into the liberal tradition, South Africa's black majority will achieve equal
liberty in the only African country denominated an "emerging market" by
the U.S. Commerce Department. °8 South Africa's belated embrace of
democracy will free its vast resources and markets from the isolation of
apartheid making them fully accessible to international capital.' Land
long ago expropriated from the African people, however, will largely
remain in white hands.210 So will the country's mineral riches-its gold,
diamonds, platinum, and other precious and strategic metals.211 The
207. Henry J. Richardson III, The Constitutive Fiction of Neutrality in U. N. Peace-
keeping, presented at The African Society of International and Comparative Law Annual
Conference (Aug. 1995) (on file with author).
208. See U.S.i South Africa: Clinton Announces Modest Aid Package, INTER PRESS SER-
VICE, May 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Inpres File.
209. See generally Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring, in ON HISTORICAL MATERALISM 202,
206 (Progress Publishers ed., 1974) ("Trade on a large scale, [particularly] world trade, requires
free owners of commodities who are unrestricted in their movements and as such enjoy equal
rights; who may exchange their commodities on the basis of laws that are equal for them all.").
210. Under the Interim Constitution, only some of the land claims of those dispossessed
would be honored. S. AvR. CONST. (Act No. 200, 1993) ch. 8, secs. 121-23. Only those who
lost their land pursuant to the Native's Land Act 27 of 1913 are eligible for restitution; others
would have no legal recourse. This remains in place under the 1996 Constitution. The
government is authorized to purchase land from white owners to facilitate "land reform," S.
AR. CONST. (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill, 1996) ch. 2 (Bill of Rights),
sec. 25(4)(a) & (b), but current landowners are protected from "arbitrary deprivation," id. at
sec. 25(1).
211. The mineral resources of South Africa include a reported fifty-four percent of the
world's production of platinum, thirty-four percent of chrome, forty-six percent of vanadium,
twenty-seven percent of gold, as well as large deposits of manganese ore, nickel, copper, and
iron ore. See South Africa's Return to World Markets Raises Competition Pressures, FERTILIZ-
ER INT'L, Jan. 11, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. South Africa is also
a historic source of many of the world's strategic minerals such as uranium. See Jean B.
Tartter, Government and Politics, in SOUTH AFRICA: A COUNTRY STUDY 219, 289 (Harold D.
Nelson, ed., 1981).
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election will bring to fruition the Borkian vision of substantive neutrality:
the application of principles that render impotent any preferences that
infringe upon the prerogatives of the powerful." 2
The Western-brokered 213 compromise further entrenches the power
imbalance; for in liberal society, "power lies with those who are able to
determine what the alternatives are to be between which choices will be
available .... [T]he range of possible alternatives is controlled by an
elite, and how they are presented is also so controlled."2
4
I am here to legitimate that compromise. It is a compromise not
unlike that which made possible the founding of the American nation.215
Property rights take precedence over human rights; racial justice is
subordinated to national unity.216 A version of federalism is adopted that
dilutes the sovereignty of the black majority, through strong and en-
trenched regional government. 27 The negotiations produce an Interim
Constitution which adopts the power-sharing paradigm. 218 It contains
thirty-three principles with which the elected constituent assembly,
charged with writing a new constitution for a democratic South Africa,
must comply. 29 Observers note prior to the election that, "[t]o an extent,
the [constituent assembly] will simply have the task of filling in the
details of the new constitution.,
220
In the final analysis, however, this hijacking of the democratic
process will not matter. The veil will banish these negotiations into the
unknown past. When the election is adjudged on the extent to which it
is free and fair, the freedom and fairness of the prior political process will
not be factored into consideration. The preconditions to freedom will
212. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 56, at 31-33 (defining "political" as speech which is
acceptable to a legislative majority. This definition bars speech potections to advocates of the
forcible overthrow of the government or to advocates of civil disobedience).
213. See OTrAwAy, supra note 204, at 245.
214. MACINTYRE, supra note 54, at 345.
215. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 26-30 (3d ed. 1992).
216. Analogously, procedural rights were enshrined in the United States Constitution
concommitant with substantive rights that protected property in slaves. Thus, property was
elevated above liberty and individual rights in the nation's basic law. See, e.g., BELL, supra
note 116, at 29-31; Engels, supra note 209, at 207 ("[I]t is significant of the specifically
bourgeois character of these human rights that the American constitution, the first to recognize
the rights of man, in the same breath confirms the slavery of the coloured races existing in
America: class privileges are proscribed, race privileges sanctioned.").
217. See Pierre de Vos et al., Introduction- Free and Fair Elections, in FREE AND FAIR
ELECTONS, supra note 4, at xix.
218. S. ArR. CoNsr., (Act No. 200, 1993) ch. 6, secs. 8b(3), 88(2) & (5), 89(1) &(2).
219. There were thirty-two Constitutional Principles agreed to, but the inclusion of a two-
thirds majority may be considered a thirty-third. See Pierre de Vos et al., Introduction- Free
and Fair Elections, in FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, supra note 4, at xx.
220. 1d&
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become the substantive rules that underlie the "free and fair" election
process. They will be the substantive rules that I will neutrally enforce.
They will be a given, a Rawlsian "widely accepted stipulation," 22' that
forms the context within which justice is defined.
Sunday, April 17, 1994.
On the eve of the Inkatha march, the Rand takes a precipitous plunge
on world markets. The march is suddenly cancelled. (I imagine State
President de Klerk making a frantic telephone call: "Gatsha, the Rand
is plummeting! Call off the march!").
Monday, April 18, 1994.
Inkatha publicly agrees to end its boycott of the election.222 In the
wake of its decision, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange rebounds. "Within
hours of the announcement ... the financial markets were buzzing.
Shares added R15 billion in value.
22 3
NEUTRALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY
In the spirit of the veil, liberalism posits self-interest as the "natural"
starting point in the quest for justice.2 Just as powerful elites in domestic
society act collectively as the "legal system" to protect their interests,
powerful States act collectively as the "international community." Inter-
national law, as a creature of sovereigns, expresses its self-interests; as
the creator of sovereignty,225 law prescribes its content.
Like the normative principle of autonomy in domestic liberal dis-
course, the principle of sovereignty in the international context gives birth
to the fiction that the parties to a conflict consent to intervention into
their affairs.226 Consent is presumed when the collective decisionmaker
221. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
222. See IFP Gets Moving as Campaign Fever Hits Climax in Durban, THE ARGUS, Apr.
20, 1994, at 1.
223. Gold Down But JSE is Still Poised for Investment Wave, THE ARGUS, Apr. 20, 1994,
at 1.
224. See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 13-14.
225. For the attributes of sovereignty, see Oscar Schachter, The United Nations and
Internal Conflict, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 401, 406 (John Norton
Moore ed., 1974) (recognizing freedom from external coercion, freedom to choose domestic
political, economic, and social systems, and territorial inviolability as the attributes of
sovereignty).
226. See id. at 417-18 ("'[S]overeignty' or 'national independence' constitutes a primary
objective of the Charter [manifested in] the consent of the territorial sovereign as a continuing
requirement for any international action by independent states."). See generally Georgiev, supra
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professes neutrality-disinterest in the outcome of the controversy. This
presupposes that the possible outcomes have not already been narrowed
to acceptable choices,27 and that the intervention itself does not ultimate-
ly determine the outcome. The fiction of equal and sovereign actors
assumes the identity of interests of all parties, and that the task of the
arbiter is to mediate between equally valid choices.
But international law is the ultimate intrusion on its creator and
creation, the sovereign State. The premise of sovereign equality is qual-
ified by the power of the collective decisionmaker, which derives legal
authority through the United Nations Charter, to which Member States
have formally consented. The five Permanent Members of the Security
Council, however, effectively control the principal lawmaking organ,22
and protect their interests while exercising authority in the name of the
international community,229 thereby defining and redefining the parameters
of sovereignty.
The result is a bifurcated version of sovereignty--one kind for the
powerful, a lesser form for the weak. The vision of sovereignty enshrined
in the Charter is, like liberalism's "autonomy," premised on procedural,
not substantive equality.230 This is reflected in the posture of the Security
Council vis-A-vis the transfer of power in South Africa.
Monday, April 25, 1994.
"On my planet, everything is very small. ,
231
The mustachioed face that peers out from the newspaper ad is tough,
but worried. A solemn, dark-eyed lass leans against his bleached denim
shirt, her shoulder safely cupped in his hand.232 They are obviously, in
South Africa's racial lexicon, "coloreds." "I'm sick and tired of being
pushed around," asserts the bold caption. The ANC is branded a "bully,"
note 83 (arguing that consent is reified as a justification for international law and interventions
based on this law).
227. See MACINTYE, supra note 54, at 336 (Liberalism's "toleration of rival conceptions
of the good in the public arena is severely limited.").
228. But see infra note 269, discussing the role of the General Assembly.
229. See generally Schachter, supra note 225, at 416-17.
230. See id. at 417-18.
231. ANTOINE DE SAINT-EXUPtiRY, THE LITTLE PRINCE.
232. See THE ARGUS, Apr. 25, 1994, at 17.
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and an appeal is made to vote for the Democratic Party,233 whose mem-
bers have "always fought as hard as they could for my rights. 2 34
In another tabloid, a young mother wistfully cradles her infant as she
pleads for "a party that'll stand up to the ANC. '2 35 Again, their racial
identity is clear; they, too, are "colored," the so-called "mixed-race," a
group which, although subjected to racist conditions under apartheid, was
nonetheless elevated above the African population and awarded benefits
to ensure their loyalty to the regime. 236 In the full-page ad, the Democrat-
ic Party promises to protect her and her child from "the abuse of power,"
the code-words for black majority rule and the end of the relatively
privileged status of the coloreds.
Such appeals to racism seem normal to South Africans accustomed
to living in a system built on racist ideology. Indeed, this is subtle by
South African standards. The National Party, however, has run its own
"Willie Horton" ad, featuring the notorious "Cape Strangler," now on trial
for killing twenty-two local boys. The ad alleges that the ANC wants to
give him and other dangerous criminals the right to vote. His face is
darkened to make him look more black.237 Other ads claim blacks will
seize houses from "colored" citizens,238 and decry affirmative action as an
ANC scheme to take away the jobs and privileges awarded under apart-
heid's sophisticated divide and conquer rules.
This theme pervades the campaign, as white parties unabashedly vie
for the "colored" vote, the majority in the Western Cape,239 the only
Province they have a chance of winning. To the veiled-color-
blind-monitors, the ads are innocuous, the slogans mere political
posturing. They do not render the election less free or less fair.24 They
do not violate the Electoral Code of Conduct.241
233. The Democratic Party of South Africa is the former Progressive Federal Party, which
was an opposition party in Parliament during apartheid. See The Democratic Party, S. AFR.
Bus. INTELLIGENCE, Feb. 14, 1994, available in 1994 WL 8221172; Francis X. Clines, The
South African Vote: The Parties, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 28, 1994, at A15.
234. THE ARGuS, supra note 232, at 17 (emphasis added).
235. CAPE TIMES, Apr. 25, 1994, at 1.
236. See JOHNSON, supra note 92, at 194.
237. See Gregory Katz, Mixed-race S. Africans are Uneasy, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
May 6, 1994, at Al, A22.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. In interviews after the voting, many "coloreds" reported that they voted for the
National Party because they feared blacks would seize their property after the inauguration. See
Id.
241. One National Party brochure, depicting black ANC members preventing a mixed-race
woman from going to church, was ruled racist by the Independent Media Commission and
withdrawn. See id.
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NEUTRALITY AS OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE
In South Africa, the international community is called upon to
mediate an internal, as opposed to interstate, conflict. 2' In the context of
internal conflict, the customary right of neutrality has been transformed
by the Charter2 A3 into a duty of nonintervention. 2' Like neutrality in the
domestic context,24 5 however, nonintervention in international law is
normative, 246 but not the norm in State practice.2A7 Despite the Charter,
242. Under customary international law, the doctrine of recognition of belligerency
provides the vehicle for neutrality in the context of internal conflicts. Application of this
doctrine accords international status to the parties to a civil conflict. Here again, moral
relativism is preserved. The insurgents are accorded the status of a "belligerent community,"
triggering the application of international legal rules regarding the conduct of war. Thus,
"[t]heir ships are not to be treated as pirates, nor are they, so far as Third States are concerned,
merely in the position of traitors." See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 254 (1979). Such neutrality would inevitably diminish the sovereignty
of the de facto State, to the extent that the international status of the rebels is recognized.
Today, as with the recognition of States, a practice of collective recognition of belliger-
ency has emerged which can be evidenced through the actions of the political organs of the
United Nations. For example, in 1968, the General Assembly began to recognize the interna-
tional character of the liberation struggles in southern Africa by calling upon the British and
Portuguese governments to grant prisoner of war status to captured freedom fighters under the
1949 Geneva Conventions on the Laws of War. G.A. Res. 2383 (XXII) at 3 (1968) (Rhodesia);
G.A. Res. 2395 (XXIII) at 3 (1968) (Portugal). A similar resolution condemned the apartheid
regime for its "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of political prisoners" captured during
the "legitimate struggle for liberation" and called for their release. G.A. Res. 2396 (XXIII) at
3, para. 8 (1968). These resolutions were adopted unanimously but for the two votes of South
Africa and Portugal.
243. Articles 2(1) and 2(2) of the Charter enshrine the principles of sovereignty, equality
and equal rights of States. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1 and 2. Moreover, the proposed
1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Peaceful and Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
embodies the liberal paradigms: "All States enjoy sovereign equality. They ... are equal
members of the international community." Report of the Special Committee on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, U.N.
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 69, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1970).
244. See U. N. CHARTER, art. 2 para. 7 (which excludes ... interventions in matters
"essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state"). But see, Oscar Schachter, The
United Nations and Internal Conflict, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 402
(John Norton Moore, ed., 1974) ("The fact that Article 2(7) contains no specific criteria for
determining what is to be deemed essentially domestic or what constitutes intervention has of
course given the United Nations organs wide latitude in applying those concepts to particular
cases.").
245. See Weschler, supra note 53, at 23 ("Is it not also true and of importance that some
of the principles the Court affirmed were strikingly deficient in neutrality, sustaining, for
example, national authority when it impinged adversely upon labor, as in the application of the
Sherman act, but not when it was sought to be employed in labor's aid?").
246. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua
v. United States) 1984 I.C.J. 169, at 186-88 (May 10) (stating that U.S. mining of Nicaraguan
harbor constitutes an act of aggression violating international law).
247. See CARTY, supra note 94, at 90 ("The principle of non-intervention belongs among
a litany of natural rights of States.... such natural rights were.., no indication at all of State
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military interventions by powerful States, on one pretext or another,
remain commonplace; such interventions were a prominent feature of the
political landscape in southern Africa throughout the liberation struggle."8
Non-military means are also used to take sides in internal conflicts; in
South Africa, foreign trade, investment and diplomacy aided the de facto
State to the detriment of the pro-democracy forces.
Election monitoring has become a highly respected form of peaceful
intervention. 9 Monitoring internationalizes an otherwise wholly domestic
political event.2"° Since elections are presumptively within the domestic
jurisdiction of a State, 25' consent is a prerequisite to intervention. Thus,
the degree of internationalization achieved through monitoring has varied
in accordance with the degree of sovereignty which the international
community accords the State in question.
Where the entity's sovereignty has been compromised in some way,
such as colonial domination or war, concerns of autonomy have given
way to international intervention which is significantly authoritative; the
monitor assumes powers of a governmental character.252 The most
extreme option is complete administration. This form of monitoring,
where the international community may control the security forces, has
been employed in situations of civil war, such as in Cambodia.253
conduct."). Jochnick and Normand point out that the contradiction between norms and practice
in the law of war can be traced to its origins: "The enlightened theories of the publicists did
not influence the practice of emerging European nation-states busily engaged in the imperial
conquest, massacre, and enslavement of millions in the Americas, Africa and Asia." Jochnick
& Normand, supra note 57, at 62.
248. For example, the United States and South Africa intervened in the Angolan civil war
by covertly arming and training UNITA for many years. See Cindy Shiner, Angola's Warring
Parties Postpone Treaty Signing, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1994, at A12.
249. See generally Fox, supra note 30.
250. The South African situation was already internationalized by virtue of apartheid and
the massive human rights violations which that system entailed. Among these violations was
the abridgement of the majority population's right to self-determination. Thus, the election,
which would normally be a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of the State, acquired
international dimensions. See Schachter, supra note 225, at 422 ("[A]t least three types of
internal conflict are not to be regarded as essentially domestic: (1) conflicts which appear to
endanger international peace and security; (2) conflicts between the peoples of a non-self-
governing territory and the administering power, and (3) conflicts involving a large-scale
deprivation of human rights of a distinct racial, ethnic, or national group within the country.").
251. See generally, IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 291-92
(4th ed. 1990) (discussing concept of domestic jurisdiction). See also U.N. CHARTER, art. 2,
para. 7 (reserving matters of domestic jurisdiction to States).
252. See generally Fox, supra note 30, at 570-87 (discussing election monitoring prior to
1945, under the United Nations system, and in the post-colonial era).
253. Article 12 of the 1991 Paris Agreement established the United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (Untac), which was granted authority to fully establish electoral laws,
voter education, registration, ballot and counting systems, manage complaints and deliver a final
assessment. See Madard Rwelamira & David Ailola, International Monitoring of Free and Fair
Elections, in FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, supra note 4, at 209, 225.
[Vol. 18:475
The Fallacy of Neutrality
Similarly, the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in
Namibia asserted some control over the former U.N. Trust territory during
the transition period.2' In that case, the United Nations played a decol-
onizing role, as it previously had done in Zimbabwe. 55
In South Africa, however, sovereignty is bifurcated; the white
minority regime's sovereignty prevails over the black majority's self-
determination and human rights claims.5 6 The "simple monitoring" model
is adopted utilizing the existing domestic structures. 257 International inter-
vention will be visible but not intrusive. The five international members
of the IEC do not even enjoy voting powers.258 Under the extreme
limitations of this form of intervention, we can only document, not
prevent the fraud; we are dependent, ultimately, upon the good will of the
regime.259
Because neutrality freezes the status quo in place, the timing and
extent of intervention can be outcome-determinative. Therefore, where
large-scale human rights deprivations are involved, a model comparable
to that employed in colonial contexts is warranted.2m Especially because
the total disenfranchisement of the African majority-over seventy
percent of the population26 -was a key aspect of that deprivation, the
need for international control of the process of extending that franchise
is heightened.
A hands-off model cannot confront the tremendous obstacles to a
democratic transition existing under South African conditions, charac-
terized by apartheid and racism, extreme State-sponsored violence,262
254. See Fox, supra note 30, at 576-79.
255. See Committee of 24 Adopts Resolution on Southern Rhodesia, WEEKLY NEWS SUM-
MARY, U.N. OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, U.N. Doc. WS/391 (1969). See also supra note
30 and accompanying text.
256. The U.N.'s goals regarding internal conflict have emphasized the maintenance of de
facto national sovereignty over other goals such as human rights and development. See
Schachter, supra note 225, at 403-04.
257. See Madard Rwelamira & David Ailola, International Monitoring of Free and Fair
Elections, in FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, supra note 4, at 228-29.
258. See id. at 230.
259. Judge Johann Kriegler, chair of the Independent Electoral Commission, stated that
"the IEC would be relying heavily on the expertise of the government's Department of Home
Affairs in planning and organizing the election." LAWYERS' COMMITTEE REPORT Issue 3, supra
note 118, at 1-2.
260. See Schachter, supra note 225, at 408. It has been suggested that the South African
situation constituted a form of "internal colonialism." See generally JOHN DUGARD, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 198-230 (1995) (analyzing the evolution of
international Human Rights Law: from the Nuremberg Trials to the South African Bill of
Rights and International Human Rights norms).
261. See CATHOLIC INSTITUTE, supra note 36, at 15.
262. See generally Keller, supra note 45.
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widespread deprivation and illiteracy, 263 and a territory of vast size and
complexity.26' The Security Council's decision to adopt such a model
reflects the longstanding position of the powerful members of the inter-
national community on South Africa's sovereignty, which has been to
treat it gingerly, notwithstanding the fact that matters of self-determi-
nation and racial discrimination are generally regarded as justifying
intrusions on sovereignty.265
The apartheid regime consistently spurned international human rights
norms. At the time of the election, South Africa was a party to only four
of the twenty-five major human rights conventions. 266 "Although [it] is a
signatory to the United Nations Charter, it did not vote for the ...
Declaration of Human Rights. 267 The United Nations General Assembly
vigorously and consistently condemned the South African regime for its
record of human rights violations,268 and declared it illegitimate.269 Indeed,
as Professor Richardson asserts, the regime had been "adjudged to be
virtually bereft of legitimacy under law." 270 Nevertheless, the powerful
States in many respects continued to accord the regime all the deference
due to a fully sovereign State. With the exception of the 1977 arms
263. See Secretary-General's Report, supra note 4, at 18 (listing among the factors
affecting the election extreme illiteracy, linguistic variety, and rural areas without access to
television, newspapers, or radio).
264. See Madard Rwelamira & David Ailola, International Monitoring of Free and Fair
Elections, in FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, supra note 4, at 234.
265. See BROWNLIE, supra note 251, at 294.
266. South Africa was a party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (1981); the Slavery Convention of 1926; the Protocol Amending
the 1926 Slavery Covnention (1953); and the Slavery Convention of 1926 as amended. See
Madard Rwelamira & David Ailola, International Monitoring of Free and Fair Elections, in
FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, supra note 4, at 219 n.13.
267. Id.
268. See, e.g., The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South
Africa, U.N. GAOR Special Political Comm., 21st Sess., Agenda Item 34, at 2, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2202 (1966) (condemning apartheid as a "crime against humanity"); International
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, U.N. GAOR 3d
Comm., 28th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 53, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3068 (1973); Relationship
between the United Nations and South Africa, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Agenda Item 3, U.N.
Doc. GA/RES/3207 (1974) (rejecting credentials of South African representative); Situation in
South Africa, U.N. GAOR Special Pol. Comm., 13th Sess., 2435th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 53,
at 7-9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/341 I/G (1975) (declaring South African government "illegitimate and
has no right to represent the people of South Africa;" also recognizing liberation movement as
"authentic representatives of overwhelming majority of South African people").
269. Although General Assembly resolutions are not legally binding per se, such
resolutions can bind States as evidence of customary law. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVEL-
OPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
2 (1963) (The "[c]ollective acts of states, repeated ... and acquiesced in by sufficient numbers
with sufficient frequency, eventually attain the status of law.").
270. Henry J. Richardson III, Constitutive Questions in the Negotiations for Namibian
Independence, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 76, 94 (1984).
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embargo, the Security Council resolutions on South African apartheid
were made pursuant to Chapter VI of the Charter, which made their
enforcement subject to the sovereign consent of the regime,271 notwith-
standing the availability of nonconsensual enforcement measures272 in
cases of breaches of peace or international crimes.273 Classical peacekeep-
ing between States274 has become the model for contemporary U.N.
election monitoring.275 In theory, its two essential tenets, consent and
neutrality, obviate concern about the justice of the intervention,276 and
ensure that a "legal" rather than a "political" solution is imposed. 7
Herein lies the paradox: liberalism's premise that neutral intervention
is not outcome-determinative contradicts its own claims about the
transformative power of rationality and law. 8 In the context of election
monitoring, the power to declare a transfer of political power "free and
fair" carries the imprimatur of law, and the ability to bestow domestic
and international legitimacy upon the results.279 This is the epitome of
liberal law as "a form of policy that changes the stakes, and often
'escalates' the intensity, of political contests; it is a constraint comparable
to force in its effects. 280
Wednesday, April 27, 1994.
I begin my work on the first day of general voting at six-thirty a.m.,
at a polling station in the Bokaap district of Capetown. This mountainous
region (the name means "above the Cape") is populated by the
271. See Schachter, supra note 225, at 414.
272. Such action may be taken under Chapter VII of the Charter when the Security
Council decides that the situation involves a threat to or a breach of the peace or an act of
aggression. See LELAND GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, COMMENTARY
AND DOCUMENTS, 306 (3d ed. 1969) (parties obligated to comply with article 40 resolutions).
273. See G.A. Res. 2202, supra note 93.
274. See Wedgewood, supra note 193, at 633 (discussing the tenets of classsical peace-
keeping).
'275. See Fox, supra note 30, at 570-96.
276. See Wedgewood, supra note 193, at 633.
277. Id.
278. See supra notes 117-124 and accompanying text.
279. Election monitoring as a form of international intervention has been an important
factor in the transition to self-government of several former colonial countries. The U.N.
Trusteeship Council has monitored plebiscites in British Togoland, British Cameroon, Western
Samoa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. See Madard Rwelamira & David Ailola, International
Monitoring of Free and Fair Elections, in FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, supra note 4, at 211 n.5.
280. Stanley Hoffman, The Study of International Law and the Theory of International
Relations, PROC. AM. SOC. INT'L. L. 26, 34 (1963).
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descendents of Malay slaves brought to the Cape to work on the sugar
plantations. There, I am to observe the preparation of the ballot boxes.
The presiding officer shows us the empty boxes, closes them, and
seals them with metal wires, fastened with metal clamps, plastic self-
locking strip seals, and red tape with wax seals. Satisfied that the boxes
are fraud-free and secure, we depart for our next assignment.
My next stop finds me in the African township of Guguletu at the
Vukukhanye Primary School. The cold grayness of the morning em-
phasizes the stark poverty of the sprawling community. I arrive at my
assigned station around seven-thirty a.m. My heartbeat quickens as I spy
in the distance a seemingly endless stream of bodies snaking around the
match-box structures that approximate housing for tens of thousands of
black South Africans.
The mood is upbeat. They have come on crutches and in wheelchairs,
or hobbling along with the help of a friend, discouraged by neither the
morning chill nor the interminable lines. Those at the front lean against
the chain-link fence surrounding the barren, dusty school yard, boasting
that they have been waiting since two a.m. "I have hope," whispers one
twenty-four year old woman softly. "Very much hope."
By eight-thirty a.m., the people are standing in a cold, driving rain,
unsheltered but undeterred. The elders are shielded by the torsos of the
young. Blankets are fetched from nearby homes. The poll has still not
opened. They wait, with the stoic patience of the oppressed.
But, ultimately their spirit is broken. The ballots do not arrive. Inside
the bare classroom, the youthful election workers, eager to put their new
training to the test, look resentful and glum. Outside the throng is restless.
The rain remains steady.
"It is a trick!" proclaims one woman at last. She is the first in line,
swathed in a tattered brown overcoat, worry lines deeply etched into her
face. I think she must be about sixty; I am saddened by the disappoint-
ment of this first-time voter. I try to cheer her up. She confides that she
is a mother of two, in her thirties, who has had little formal education.
Like the majority of people, especially women and those in rural areas,
she has not been exposed to voter education initiatives. 211 "The regime
tricked us into thinking we were going to vote today," she is
281. Nearly twenty million of South Africa's qualified voters were first-time voters. Previ-
ously disenfranchised voters were unfamiliar with basic concepts, such as the secrecy of the
ballot, the nature and process of democracy, how to obtain proper eligibility documents. These
questions were usually not covered in voter education initiatives; the substance was often
limited to a basic explanation of the voting procedure. Nevertheless, the Secretary-General
reported a successful voter education campaign. See Secretary-General's Report supra note 4,
at 7, 18, paras. 63-64.
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convinced. I promise her that it is real, not just a cruel joke, that I will
try to do something about it. I phone to the IEC headquarters. I bring her
hot tea from inside the polling station. I wait with her.
Slowly the dismal realization dawns. The people begin to trail away,
one by one at first, then in droves, as the unrelenting rain comes in
torrents, drowning out their residual determination. They will not vote
today.
I am caught in the fundamental contradictions of the unknown,2"2 the
unknowable,2"3 and the immutable.84 I phone the IEC several times that
day, and again the next. I offer to go wherever the ballots are and get
them, but am told that this exceeds the scope of my mandate. Neutrality
proceduralizes, rather than resolves conflict.28 5 I fill out an "Election
Observer Incident Reporting Form. 286 But in the three days of voting, 7
no ballots ever make it to Vukukhanye Primary School.
The IEC was to receive many such reports. In all, nearly one-quarter
of the polling stations lacked sufficient ballots and other materials."ss
Guguletu, I will later learn, is an ANC stronghold. The IEC staffer in
charge of delivering the ballots had somehow "disappeared" with them.
Since there had never been a census in the township, no one knows how
many voters were turned away.
Less than a month before the election, a United Nations team re-
ported that the country was woefully unprepared for the estimated
eighteen to twenty-three million prospective voters. 9 Moreover, formal
282. In the original position the past is unknown. "[N]o one knows his place in society,
his class position or social status; ... natural assets and abilities .... parties do not know the
particular circumstances of their own society ... their economic or political situation, or the
level of civilization and culture...". RAWLS, supra, note 2, at 137.
283. Moral truth is unknowable. "Systems of ends are not ranked in value." d at 19.
284. Liberal institutions are immutable. See id at 7 ("[Ihe legal protection of freedom
of thought and liberty of conscience, competitive markets, private property in the means of
production and the [patriarchal] monogamous family are [the subject of justice] examples of
major social institutions."). But see MACINTYRE, supra note 54, at 335 (quoting David Lewis
in Philosophical Papers at x-xi (vol. 1, 1983): "[O]ur 'intuitions' are simply opinions.").
285. See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 73, at 95. See also BELL, supra note 16, at 104.
286. Observers were responsible for reporting specific needs to IEC officials. The
Commission had broad regulatory powers over political advertising, electoral irregularities, and
adjudication proceedings. See John Murphy et al., Postscript- The Legal Framework of South
Africa's First Democratic Election, in FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, supra note 4, at 249.
287. The vote was extended for an additional day in many areas because of the widespread
insufficiency of ballots and other irregularities. See Rodney Pinder, Mandela Confident of Free,
Fair Election, REUTERS N. AM. WIRE, Apr. 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Arcnws File.
288. Only 75.71 percent had sufficient materials. See Secretary-General's Report, supra
note 4. at 23.
289. A small United Nations delegation visited South Africa on a fact-finding mission
from February 28 to March 6, 1994. The group's focus was on the preparation for the April
1994 elections, including general arrangements, voter education, safety conditions, polling sta-
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complaints from registered parties and the IEC's own investigations
produced evidence of systematic irregularities.2" The South African
Police-implicated in conspiracies to derail the elections291-were to
investigate and resolve these disputes.
The veil barely conceals my disillusionment as I leave the
Vukukhanye Primary School. I move to another polling station in
Guguletu. A team of official United Nations monitors are just leaving.
"No ballots here!" they announce almost jubilantly as they proceed to
their next assignment.
My next station is in Langa, another desolate black township miles
outside of Capetown. Everything appears to be going smoothly here. The
election officials are very courteous and professional-they look as if
they have been doing this for years. The presiding officer is an impres-
sive young lawyer who inspires great hope for South Africa's future
leaders. Observers are summoned whenever voters need and are given
assistance. We are served coffee and tea.
Since there was no time for voter registration, each voter is required
to produce an identity document, which is scrutinized closely. Once
issued a ballot paper, officials mark the voter's fingers with an indelible
dye to show that she has voted. She proceeds alone to a screened voting
area, marks the ballot paper, indicating the party for which she wishes to
tions, the role of the international observers and monitors and the continued role of the interna-
tional community after the elections. See Letter Dated 31 March 1994, supra note 26, at 5,
para. 12. The mission recorded inadequate field staffing and deployment by the IEC--only a
"minute fraction" of the necessary staff had been appointed. Offices were "scarcely function-
al." Secretary-General's Report, supra note 4, at 16, para. 59(a). IEC voter information inaccu-
rately identified polling stations. Id. at 16, para. 59(b). The IEC estimated that less than a third
of the 126,000 ballot boxes needed were available. Id at 17, para. 59(c). The problem of
inadequate plans for the field structure, including the movement of critical electoral equipment
and materials, was compounded by scarce resources such as vehicles and drivers. The IEC had
not developed an adequate logistical plan for the secure movement of ballot papers and boxes;
had not developed a security plan; and had inadequate plans for the compilation and an-
nouncement of polling results, compounded by the fact of poor development of computer
systems, ultimately forcing the resort to a manual tally of voting figures. Id. at 17-18.
290. Registered complaints totaled 3,558 including: intimidation (1,013 cases); violence
(177 cases); interference with canvassing (322 cases); destruction of posters (267); "Chapter
X" matters [undue influence, bribery, impersonation, interference w/election materials, canvass-
ing, etc.,] (106 cases); "Various" voting infringements (540 cases); illegal identity cards (349
cases); Violations of the Electoral Code of Conduct (298 cases); Miscellaneous (688).
KwaZulu/Natal, the base of the Inkatha Freedom Party, registered the largest number of
complaints (741), followed by Western Cape (475) and PWV (409). See Secretary-General's
Report, supra note 4, at 28, paras. 100-03.
291. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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vote; displays the ballot paper to a voting officer so that the official mark
stamped on the back of the ballot can be clearly recognized; and places
the ballot in the ballot box. Eyes brimming with hope, and proud,
toothless smiles give me, at last, a sense of fulfillment.
At Manenberg Secondary School, in a "colored" township, I hear an
illiterate elderly woman, being given assistance,2' say she wants to vote
for "Madiba. '' 293 She is bruskly interrogated by a monitor from the IEC
in Afrikaans: 294 "Are you sure you want to vote for the ANC? Do you
know'what are the aims of the ANC?" A legitimate question, I suppose,
had it been addressed to the two goats standing patiently in line outside.
I report it to Fatima, the presiding officer. She is brittle and defen-
sive, resentful of my outsider interference. Reluctantly she gives me a
form to fill out. Unsatisfied, I insist on calling the IEC to report the
incident. I am told by an ANC Party Observer that there have been many
complaints from voters of intimidation at this polling station.
In Mitchell's Plain, another "colored" area, election workers are
openly campaigning for the ruling National Party. Ballot secrecy is
compromised when officials log the names of the many voters who have
needed assistance. When I raise the issue with IEC monitors, they assure
me that the officials are doing nothing improper.
The polling station at Good Hope Seminary in central Capetown, a
white area, is my last assignment for the day. It is modem, warm and
bright, and no one is required to stand out in the rain. There is plenty of
everything-ballots, friendly chatter, food. I am struck by the sharp
contrast between this and the meager facilities in the African and "col-
ored" townships. It seems unfair. But to the South Africans it is normal,
the way things are.
The veil reasserts its presence. I must not acknowledge this contrast,
for knowledge of difference "allows people to be guided by their preju-
dices, rather than reason. ,295
We observe the closing and securing of the ballot boxes: all unused
ballots are counted in our presence and placed in boxes secured with
masking tape. Then the openings of the ballot boxes are sealed with wire
292. Illiterate voters were entitled to assistance from a presiding officer in the presence
of at least two monitors, observers, or any two other IEC officials. See Secretary-General's
Report, supra note 4, at 13, para. 50.
293. See supra note 3.
294. See supra note 24.
295. See RAwLs, supra note 2, at 19.
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padlocks, red tape, and red wax seals. But no provision has been made
for the security of the ballot boxes as they are transported to the counting
stations.
I retire late that night, listening uneasily to the steady rain. The next
morning dawns brisk and clear.
Thursday, April 28. 1994.
Our van approaches the Kayamandi "location ' 296 on the second day
of general voting, driving through the lush wine-growing region of
Stellenbosch. A voluptuous rainbow arcs prophetically in the South
African autumn sky. Turnout is light. The community bears the putrid
scars of yesterday's heavy rainfall. I try not to notice the stench of the
open sewers that pervades the air, or the residents forced to wade
through puddles brimming with human waste. I am moved by glimpses
of heroic attempts to remain human in an inhuman situation: some of the
tin shacks have nice rugs on the floor; a few even have pirated electrici-
ty.
Sunday, May 1, 1994.
The vote counting begins. The tallying is slow and arduous. Due to
a lack of computers, it is being conducted by hand.
Thursday, May 5, 1994.
Press reports indicate that the ANC is nearing the two-thirds majority
it needs to write the Constitution and carry out its program.297
Friday, May 6, 1994.
I watch the final vote count on TV with a prominent South African
family. My work completed, I am finally able to shed the veil and cheer
openly for the ANC.
296. See supra note 139 discussing the forced removal policy.
297. See, e.g., ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 6, 1994, at Al (reporting ANC had won 65.2
percent, with three-fourths of ballots counted); Bill Keller, Buthelezi Seems to Beat Mandela
in Zulu Province, N.Y. TIMEs, May 6, 1994, at Al (reporting 64.7 percent).
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Despite pervasive flaws,29 the elections are declared "substantially
free and fair.''299 Prior to the announcement of the official results, the
United Nations and other government monitors issue an "interim as-
sessment" of the elections process, concluding that the IEC successfully
accomplished its goal.3"o Thus, the imprimatur of international law is
placed upon the government of national unity, headed by the ANC, and
including the former ruling National Party, and Inkatha. The country is
free to embark upon a path of reconstruction and development.
Officially, the ANC wins 62.65 percent of the vote, lacking the two-
thirds majority needed to write a new constitution without compromising
major principles. Significantly, the National Party won the Western Cape,
with the overwhelming support of the "colored" community.30' And
Inkatha "won" Natal, amid widespread allegations of fraud and intimida-
tion.' While most of the fraud appeared to be directed against the ANC,
the ANC leadership ultimately acquiesced in the vote stealing.0 3 And the
international community achieved its goal of successful elections, protect-
ing its interests at the expense of the peoples' franchise. An American
reporter expressed it thus: "Inkatha and the National Party have their own
298. According to the United Nations Report, materials were lacking at 23.44 percent of
the "special voting" stations which accommodated persons who were confined or ill. See
Secretary-General's Report, supra note 4, at 22, paras. 79-84. Procedures were correctly
applied at only 73.72 percent of the stations visited. With respect to the general voting, on
April 27-28, observers collectively reported that correct procedures were applied at 81.13
percent of voting stations. The province of Northern Transvaal was reportedly the "worst
overall" regarding sufficiency of materials, supplies and correct procedures. Late staffing,
inadequate training and deployment also created systematic problems. Polling was extended to
April 29 in Transkei, Ciskei, Venda, Lebowa, Gazankulu, and KwaZulu, to compensate for the
procedural problems in these areas. See id. at 23, para. 83. Ballot counting was particularly
problematic. Specific shortcomings included insufficient staff and facilities to ensure uninter-
rupted counting (only 84.06 percent had sufficient accommodations); the improper delivery of
materials (only 78.82 percent complied with prescribed custody procedures); ballot paper
reconciliation procedures (only 74. 45 percent adhered to proper procedure); Notably, the IEC
Chairman actually directed the modification of procedures because they proved to be "too
onerous." See id. at 25, para. 88. The Secretary-General noted allegations of fraudulent
interference with ballot materials in certain parts of the country, but declined to offer a
judgment in his report. See id. at 89, para. 25.
299. See John Carlin, ANC Wins Seven out of Nine Provinces to Complete Landslide,
INDEPENDENT (London), May 7, 1994, at 12.
300. See Secretary-General's Report, supra note 4, at 15-16, paras. 55-58.
301. See Gregory Katz, supra note 237, at Al ("Instead of voting for the ANC, which
launched the anti-apartheid struggle that led to mixed-race South Africans getting full
citizenship, they gave a resounding victory to the National Party that designed and imple-
mented apartheid in 1948.").
302. In Natal, internal memoranda from IEC monitors urged that the provincial vote be
invalidated. See Keller, supra note 297.
303. See Dele Olojede, ANC Ignored Fraud; Inkatha 'Victory' Appears Rigged, NEWSDAY
(Nassua and Suffolk ed.) May 17, 1994, at A4.
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provincial bases to work from-so democracy is flourishing here in the
new South Africa.
304
And so, neutrality has once again preserved "sovereign consent," but
it is no more than Locke's "empty concept of the will." 5 The real
referents in South Africa, the African, "Colored" and Indian masses, had
no sovereignty to protect.
EPILOGUE
June 17-30 1995.
I have returned to South Africa to assess the progress of democracy.
In the airport, I am greeted by a young African woman in the immigra-
tion booth. She looks at me and smiles; we exchange knowing glances.
She is aware that I recognize the significance of this moment. It is the
first time an African has been permitted to hold such a post.
In my Johannesburg hotel, African clerks and waiters are being
trained to use the cash register-they have never before been allowed to
handle money. On the flight from Johannesburg to Capetown, I travel
with several new African members of Parliament. They appear serious,
but unsure, awed perhaps by their new positions and responsibilities.
They are dressed in worn but stately attire as they retrieve battered
suitcases from the terminal luggage rack.
But my perception of change rapidly dissolves as I pass Crossroads.
The burgeoning squatter camp has greatly expanded, moving like a
seething mass of corrugated tin and barbed wire to encroach upon the
highway. It is as if it intends to cross the road and continue all the way
to Capetown, as if it were another "dark human cloud" as DuBois
described the newly emancipated African-American slaves, "that clung
like remorse" on the heels of the liberating Union troops, "almost
engulfing and choking them. In vain were they ordered back, in vain
were bridges hewn from beneath their feet; on they trudged and writhed
and surged ... a starved and naked horde of tens of thousands. ' 3 6 The
government's first budget shifted only three percent of spending toward
304. Bob Drogin, L.A. TIMES Reporter on Washington Week in Review (PBS television
broadcast, May 6, 1994) available in LEXIS, World Library, Arcnws File.
305. See COMMONS, supra note 96, at 187.
306. DuBois, supra note 78, at 26-27.
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the poor;3 of a promised one million houses in five years, it has built
only 12,000 in two years.0
The scene inside Parliament is strange. I listen to the debate, which
focuses on the growing crime problem. An ANC MP points out that
increased crime is a phenomenon that typically accompanies a transition
from authoritarian rule. The white opposition members shout "Here,
here!" boo and hiss in stereotypical British style. Where are the pow-
dered wigs, I wonder? The problem of political violence persists. There
were 457 deaths and 592 injuries in incidents of political violence in the
government's first one hundred days.'
I meet with new government officials; they impress upon me the
practical monetary problems caused by the internationally brokered deal.
The country's vast wealth remains in private hands, and the government
is broke; it cannot even afford to equip Parliament with computers.310
The need to generate government revenues provides an impetus for
privatization,31 the perceived panacea for capital problems in many parts
of the world, encouraged by the ecomomic policies of the major pow-
ers.31 1 Ironically, the ANC vigorously opposed the apartheid regime's
proposals to privatize state-owned enterprises, likening the plan to
"selling the family silver without even consulting the family. '313 Now in
307. See Paul Taylor, South Africa's 'St. Nelson' No 'Messiah' to Neighbors, WASH.
POST, Sept. 2, 1994, at Al.
308. See Editorial, supra note 137.
309. See Human Rights Commission Assesses First 100 Days, BBC SuMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, Aug. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS News Library, BBCSWB File.
310. An interesting analogy is provided by the accession of blacks in the United States to
political leadership in the bankrupt urban communities. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 16, at
23-24.
311. According to a recent World Bank report, the debt crisis facing developing countries
exacerbates capital shortages, while official sources of capital, upon which sub-Saharan Africa
is disproportionately dependent, are drying up. In Latin American countries such as Argentina
and Mexico, infrastructure services were privatized as a result of "severe macroeconomic
distress" to generate revenues for government. See David Ferreira & Kamran Khatami,
Financing Private Infrastructure in Developing Countries World Bank Discussion Paper No.
343 at 15-16 (1996) [hereinafter World Bank Discussion Paper]. "In Mexico the divestiture
program began in 1983 as part of the macroeconomic stabilization program adopted with the
support of the International Monetary Fund." Id. at 16. In Argentina, needed capital was
provided to reduce the government's debts to foreign commercial banks. See id. "In addition
to relieving the public sector's managerial constraints and alleviating fiscal burdens, privatiza-
tion of infrastructure projects helps develop capital markets and create a [corporate] base." Id.
at 17. "[I]nternational flows increasingly seek investment opportunities in developing and
emerging markets due to lower yields in industrial countries ... Long-term government bond
yields in the G-3 markets (Germany, Japan and the United States) have fallen by half since
1990." Id. at 22.
312. For example, "public enterprises, industrial promotion, and trade protection are out;
privatization, industrial deregulation, and free trade are in." Id. at 14.
313. See Christopher S. Wren, Pretoria Retreats on Privatization, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
1990, at A9 (quoting Max Sisulu, head of the ANC's economics department).
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power, some elements in the party are pushing for a change in position.
But privatization can have extremely adverse consequences for domestic
employment.3 14 This would be devastating in South Africa, where more
than forty percent of the black workforce is unemployed.315
I travel to Durban to investigate the rumored fraud in Natal. I am
told by ANC activists that they were urged by their leaders not to pursue
legal challenges to Inkatha's stolen victory. They are frustrated and
angry. They feel betrayed. Some, on the other hand, remain cautiously
optimistic. In a modest tavern in the township of Guguletu, I seek out the
views of township residents. I share a drink with Themba and his friends
whom I meet there. "Most of the people I know don't have jobs," he
responds wistfully when I ask what his hopes are for the future. "And I
would like a house." Mandela has only been in office a year, he reminds
me. "We will give him a chance."
I have tea with a dear old friend who is now a high-level government
official. He tells me that during the counting, certain Western heads of
state telephoned Mandela, cautioning him to do something about the
ANC's wide margin of victory.316 (So the omnipresent and omnipotent
"monitors" were not restricted by the veil!) Thus, while the sovereignty
of the white minority was sheltered, the sovereignty of the black majority
was compromised from the outset; their just demands for redistribution
of the country's vast wealth were thwarted by the deal through which
their political freedom was negotiated.
The creation of a black elite will be well under way if Mandela
succeeds in implementing his privatization program. Yet, such an elite
can only expect to remain subservient to foreign capital, upon which the
South African economy is so heavily dependent." 7 Will the price of the
negotiated political freedom in South Africa be, as in the rest of Africa,
economic slavery? The rash of strikes by the powerful trade unions
314. In Argentina, for example, the company responsible for railways and subways was
privatized. "In 1989, before it was privatized, the company employed 92,500 people. By 1994
the private concessionaires [companies from Belgium, Japan, Portugal and the United States,
along with Argentine partners] and the authorities that assumed responsibility for its services
together employed just over 19,500 people." World Bank Discussion Paper, supra note 311,
at 18.
315. See S. African Official Unemployment Rate is 32.6 PCT, REUTERS FIN. SERVICE,
Mar. 31, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
316. Cf. Article 21, Universal Declaration of Human Rights G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., at 75, U.N. Doec. AIRES/217 (1948) ("[T]he will of the people shall be the basis of
the authority of government.").
317. Because infrastructure facilities are usually very expensive and local capital markets
may be too thin to mobilize sufficient funds, foreign capital can help jump-start the privatiza-
tion process. South Africa's economy has long been dependent on foreign capital, which
accounts for the effectiveness of economic sanctions in bringing down apartheid. See generally,
U.N. DEP'T OF POL. AND SEC. COUN. AFFAIRS, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH AFRICA, U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/SER.A/1, U.N. Sales No. 67.II.K.9 (1967).
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indicates that their struggle is ongoing.3' The South African people, who
endured some of the worst atrocities known to humanity in the course of
that struggle, will no more readily submit to black domination than to
white. Their just aspirations go beyond procedural equality, and their
right to economic self-determination will not whither away because the
anachronism of apartheid has been replaced with a more sophisticated
form of oppression.
What does the future hold in store for little Nelson Madiba, as she
embarks on her life-journey? With the demise of apartheid, her condition
has lost its international dimension." 9 The veil of ignorance offers her no
protection from the ravages of naked power that are now free to
reign-until the next election momentarily transforms naked power into
pin-striped law. Then the veil will once again disguise the forces that
dictate the possibilities of her life. Seen through the veil they will acquire
an aura of inevitability, universality and permanence. Seen through the
veil they will not look like the historically determined contingencies that
they are, vulnerable to the countervailing power of the millions who, like
her, are not among the privileged.
I fear that the auspicious promise of "a better life for all" that
heralded her arrival will not be realized in her lifetime. Nevertheless, this
slogan-necessitated by postmodern conditions 32 0 -moves closer to the
dream of real equality than liberalism's promise of equal liberty. And
together with eighteenth century slogans of human rights,32' twentieth
century social and economic rights-to housing, health care, water, food
and education-found their way into the new South African Constitution.
Significantly, the Preamble "[rlecognize[s] the injustices of [the] past.
'322
There is hope in this, because liberalism is sometimes forced into
concessions and accommodations by its own ideological rhetoric. The
transformative power of ideology, often to the bafflement of its pro-
mulgators, is a result of the attempt of the dispossessed to realize the
promises of the rhetoric.323 To avoid this transformation, liberal political
theory attempts to shape and narrow the permissible discourse by
318. See Editorial, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 8, 1996, at A8.
319. See e.g., Henry J. Richardson III, Book Review: International Law: A South African
Perspective, by John Dugard, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 656, 658 (1995).
320. See MACINTYRE, supra note 7, at 65 ("[C]laims to the possession of rights ...
presuppose ... the existence of a socially established set of rules [which] come into existence
at particular historical periods under particular social circumstances.").
321. See Engels, supra note 209 ("And as people were ... living ... in a system of
independent states dealing with each other on an equal footing ... it was a matter of course
that the demand for equality should assume a general character reaching out beyond the
individual state, that freedom and equality should be proclaimed human rights.").
322. See generally S. AFR. CoNs'r. (May 8, 1996).
323. See generally BELL, supra note 116, at 252-53.
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compartmentalizing disciplines, sanitizing scholarship of political point
of view, and emphasizing lifeless abstractions. That its idealist vision of
equal liberty has no basis in reality is beside the point of the discourse;
that its vision of justice as procedural equality advantages the powerful
is the point.
Contemporary political theory is dominated by the Enlightenment
themes which have been posited as universal. 3 5 Through the univer-
salization of the central theme of rationality, "present and future in-
equalities were now said to be merited inequalities, the consequences of
the presumedly autonomous inner efforts of individuals. ''326 Neutrality
masks the fact that the unequal distribution of wealth and poverty,
privilege and hopelessness is not an aberration, but a fundamental and
essential component of the market state; that Crossroads must exist, for
it is an integral part of the global economy; 327 that the impoverishment of
the South is a requisite for the prosperity of the North.32
The obliteration of history is the chronic obsession of liberalism; in
this way it is able to successfully characterize historic injustices as too
remote in time to be of significance.32 9 "From the standpoint of indi-
vidualism ... the self is detachable from its social and historical roles
and statuses."3 ° We are therefore obliged to view history through the
filmy veil: as fantasy and myth, glorifications of the past and its
progeny.
331
324. See e.g., MACINTYRE, supra note 7, at 235 (Theoretical concepts are used "to furnish
us with a pluralist political rhetoric whose function is to conceal the depth of our conflicts.").
325. See R.B.J. Walker, East Wind, West Wind: Civilizations, Hegemonies, and World Or-
ders, in CULTURE, IDEOLOGY, AND WORLD ORDER, supra note 59, at 10. See also, Immanuel
Wallerstein, Civilizations and Modes of Production: Conflicts and Convergences, in CULTURE,
IDEOLOGY, AND WORLD ORDER, supra note 59, at 60-61 ("Just as British power and capitalist
enterprise came to pervade the furthest corners of the world, so did the presumptions about
universalist truths come to pervade and define our consciousnesses, our cosmologies, our
moralities, our scientific efforts.").
326. Immanuel Wallerstein, Civilizations and Modes of Production: Conflicts and
Convergencies, in CULTURE, IDEOLOGY, AND WORLD ORDER, supra note 59, at 60-61.
327. See R.B.J. Walker, East Wind, West Wind: Hegemonies, and World Orders, in
CULTURE, IDEOLOGY, AND WORLD ORDER, supra note 59, at 7 ("The universalization of paro-
chial social and political concepts ... appears as part of a system of stratification, one in
which poorer states are integrated into a global division of labor organized by, and to the
advantage of, the dominant powers.").
328. See id. at 8 ("Despite almost daily reminders, it is not always easy to comprehend
the extent to which ... the American way of life depends on the brutal exercise of power
beyond its borders, on the underwriting of corruption and naked aggression on a global
scale."); ("Sympathy for the poor is readily available, but it is more difficult to absorb the idea
that poverty is at least partly perpetuated by the wealth of those who sympathize."). Id. at 13.
329. See BELL, supra note 116, at 138.
330. See MACINTYRE, supra note 7, at 205 ("Such individualism is expressed by those
modern Americans who deny responsibility for the effects of slavery upon black Americans,
saying, 'I never owned any slaves."').
331. See MACINTYRE, supra note 54, at 4 ("[Liberalism's] conception of an ideal
rationality as consisting in the principles which a socially disembodied being would arrive at
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But for me, growing up in New Orleans during the era of American
apartheid, the interdependence of law and history has never been merely
an abstract concept. Facing the challenges of life today, in the second
post-Reconstruction era,332 I have disavowed the myth of law as liberator.
Yet, I embrace the postmodernist challenge to liberalism's postulates,
rejecting ahistorical neutrality, ideologically imposed limitations on
solutions, and the presumed illegitimacy of partisanship.333 And I remain
convinced that the discourse of rights that has matured through these
decades of struggle remains a powerful weapon in the hands of those of
us who, like Nelson Madiba Lakay, must yet set themselves free.
illegitimately ignores the inescapably historically and socially context-bound character which
any substantive set of principles of rationality, whether theoretical or practical, is bound to
have.").
332. The first Reconstruction ended with the Hayes-Tilden compromise of 1877, through
which the Republicans promised the Democrats both to remove all federal troops from the
southern States and not to intervene further in political affairs in those States. See BELL, supra
note 116, at 32-33. In the author's view, the second Reconstruction commenced with the
Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education, and ended with Regents v.
Bakke in 1979.
333. The post-modernist "questions the context of the discourse which he deconstructs
[and]... treats it as a historically conditioned discipline ... [and] questions the uses to which
it is put." Carty, supra note 90, at 66.
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